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


THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL CULTURE:

THE MAKING OF THE NEW MAN

IN DEVELOPING STATES



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## ABSTRACT

In many of the newly created nations the leaders have declared themselves dedicated to the "making of the new man" who, they hope, will build the utopian society described in their particular national philosophies. In this thesis, an attempt is made to bring under examination part of the mechanisms through which such an experiment is attempted. Starting with a given situation of change, particular attention is focused on the concept and type of ideology used, as well as on its relationship to the traditional political culture which it must change. Within this context, general conclusions on the place of the socialization process, as well as the interrelationship between political ideology, political socialization, and political culture are sketched against the background of the Cuban experiment with the "making of the new man". Concluding remarks place the problem in more general terms.





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## INTRODUCTION

Within a very general frame of reference, the present discussion starts from a premise that may be defined, in a way, as human determinism; that is, it assumes the dictum "the situation makes the man", while also assuming that the situation that makes the man has been created, purposefully or accidentally, by other men before him. (This image of the world need not, however, lead one to an absurdly deterministic image of society; for determinism and free will are not necessarily at opposite ends of the social freedom spectrum.) If one pursues the first proposition, an interesting question poses itself: is there anything in the nature, character, personality, of man, that is inherently his, and that defies pre-determination and moulding? The question itself is an old one, and answers to it are still sought. Yet this type of inquiry is a very practical and immediate problem in the new developing states of Africa, Latin America and Asia; for in those regimes, some of the leaders are attempting to create a "new" man, who will both cope with, and eventually fit the new situation. The problem is practical because the ideal political system that is sought may have to be adjusted if the "new" man cannot be created; it is immediate because the "new" man is conceived to fit into a system that would, at least theoretically, bring about rapid economic development. It is the man-made situation, purposefully created with the specific goal of moulding the new man that sets the general tone of this paper. More specifically, it is contended that particular cultures (political, in a narrower context) mould and shape men just as they, in turn, are shaped and moulded by societal forces--in this



case, purposefully created ideologies.

Revolutions, insofar as they are complete and radical changes of established social and political orders, provide an auspicious historical moment for the introduction of this type of social experiment with the least amount of opposition. The revolution, in this context, need not be a blood bath marked by violence, although the symbol of purification that may be invoked in that context has proven useful to leaders. Thus many of the newly independent states have had revolutions only insofar as their leaders have declared one-- or have defined the situation as "revolutionary". Revolutions, whether violent or peaceful, are necessary for pragmatic reasons of the need for both justification and mobilization. Justification because, historically, revolutions have come to mean socio-political change (more towards the Left than to the Right in the latter part of the twentieth century); mobilization because revolutions are generally thought to be accompanied by a period of experimentation with socio-political scheme variation in symbol and emotion charged settings.

In a recent review of most of the general contemporary theoretical literature on revolutions--individual frustration-aggression, systemic frustration, group conflict, definitions of "revolution"--Stanley Kochanek has criticised modern theorists because they,

by and large are trying to explain why men rebel rather than why revolutions occur and why governments collapse. Therefore the study of revolution has tended to slight such questions as who brings about a revolution, what ideals revolutionaries hold out, why revolutions take a particular course to a particular outcome, what the obstacles to revolution are, and what countervailing forces may thwart the objectives of a superficially successful revolution.





Somehow the present social science literature has failed to capture the essence of revolutions. Revolutions are desperate acts; they take unpredictable turns; they can be reversed or arrested; but above all, they aim at fundamental transformation of society and of man himself. They are fueled by ideologies which do not simply take advantage of discontent but point as well to a picture of the future. They are led by men, even when they seem most spontaneous. Revolutions occur because men want them to occur and not simply because of some general feeling of malaise . . . Individual discontent must be translated into collective discontent, and it is this translation process which raises questions about leadership, ideas, and mobilization.<sup>1</sup>

The same argument applies to the aftermath of taking power; change, after all, occurs with time. In this context, successful revolutions may be defined as those where the ideological leaders or their followers were able to carry out the proposed changes. Yet the "ability" of the leaders to stay in power implies legitimacy, both for political and mobilization purposes; and mobilization of the masses behind the leaders and/or their goals is required for goal-attainment. J. P. Nettl has pointed out that while

(1)egitimacy in developing countries is a particular combination of authoritative legitimacy personified by an outstanding leader, and a structure or structures through which such charisma is routinized. . . . The mobilization structures do not ultimately derive their legitimacy from elections, nor from the accretion of Hegelian legitimacy accorded to a state bureaucracy, but from values and norms of dissociation emphasized by the structure . . .<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Stanley Kochanek, "Perspectives on the Study of Revolution and Social Change," Comparative Politics, 5, No. 3 (April 1973), 318-319.

<sup>2</sup> J. P. Nettl, Political Mobilization (New York: Basic Books, 1967), p. 263.





Thus both legitimation and mobilization require a change in the political culture of the country because of new norms, values, goals, that must be institutionalized; this is perhaps best illustrated by modern African revolutions that have had to cope with internal tribal rivalries. These modern revolutions have also emphasized the fact that the particular tool of transformation of political cultures was political ideology.

It is the attempt to create the new man, through a change in political culture--which is performed by the new or revolutionary ideology--that forms the focus of discussion here. In the man versus the situation context, insofar as the traditional general and political cultures are the given environment, the socio-political revolution must be effected by working within the situation and with it. Thus, in this context, the attempt to create the new man will be effected through a change in the environment that generally shapes human beings. In more practical terms, the "shaping" occurs through a system's (overt or tacit) socialization process. Along these lines, political ideology is usually seen as the overtly political socialization tool, while political culture is understood to be the latent, socio-cultural socializer. Such a strict differentiation between the functions of the two is not readily apparent in reality; this may be due to the fact that they interact with and influence each other to a great extent. An implication of this hypothesis is the fact that, given that political cultures are essentially conservative--difficult to change, thus long-lived--an ideology that appeals to traditional strands within a particular culture will evoke a much stronger commitment than the imposition of a new structure, culturally



alien in its orientations; the stronger response generated in this context may be attributed to the fact that in this context, ideologies operate at a fairly emotional level. Socio-cultural and political traditions specific to a country will usually show why the revolution or the assumption of power was effected in a particular manner; by the same token, an ideology that appeals to tradition will show why the population supports (or tolerates) a certain political regime by revealing the traditional "legitimizing" pattern contained within it.

The above sets out the general tenor of the discussion. Much of it, however, hinges on a definition of ideology; thus the first few pages will be devoted to the selection of a concept of ideology that will be useful in the context of this discussion. The clarification of the working definition of ideology will be attempted through a historical review of the progressive changes in the meaning of the concept; the criterion of selection is based upon the contended interrelationship between ideology, political culture, and political socialization, in terms of the function that ideology performs in it. The interrelationship is discussed in the section that follows a definition of the two other concepts, political culture and political socialization; special reference to the process involved in the making of the new man will be attempted in the context of that section. The second section of the paper is more case-study oriented, while attempting to parallel the more theoretical first part. Thus, one section deals with Négritude, Ujamaa and Castroism as examples of content and function ideologies, while the next illustrates the conclusions of the section on the interrelationship between the three concepts through an





examination of the attempt at building the new man in Cuba.

A few general but important restrictions on the field of discussion need to be pointed out in this necessarily brief introduction. The first concerns the type of socio-political system examined; generally, it is assumed that they are of the type that David Apter terms "sacred collectivity" models, based on the conception of society as a corporation;<sup>3</sup> in that context, the community rather than the individual is the important variable, and the goals of the system are imbued with a quality of higher moral value than those of the individual. The particular subtype of the above model that will be examined here is the one-party mobilization system. A complete definition of it would be too lengthy; it may suffice here to note that it is, according to Apter, primarily concerned with creating new values, which "means that political leaders are trying to work out a moral system of authority."<sup>4</sup> To an extent, these systems may also be described as totalitarian; with numerous variations, they largely share Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski's six characteristics of that type of system: an official ideology, a single mass party (usually led by one man), a system of police control, party (or state) monopoly of the mass communication network, of the army, and of the economy.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1965), pp. 31-32, hereafter cited as Apter, The Politics... .

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>5</sup> Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy", in Comparative Politics, ed. Harry Eckstein and David Apter (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963), p. 467.



The second major restriction concerns the dubious validity of the concept of "political" culture. Even for Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba "political" culture rests ultimately upon a set of basic or primitive belief and value systems,<sup>6</sup> which may make the political connotation a mere abstraction. For present purposes, however, it will be assumed that the concept is valid, at least on a theoretical, analytical level.

Thirdly, although such concepts as mobilization and legitimacy are usually found in the context of nation-building literature, a conscious effort has been made to avoid the latter; for much of it starts from the premise of a tribal, multi-ethnic society which makes national integration the first priority of the system's maintenance, while this discussion assumes a higher starting level of integration. As well, nation-building in terms of integrating a multi-ethnic society may be viewed as an ideological socialization problem, in terms of a) various areas of stress in the ideological content and b) differences of emphasis on the various structures and agents of socialization. Thus the problem is far from being crucial to this discussion.

Finally, one perhaps very important aspect of the "making of the new man" is the moral or ethical question of an elite's determining the fate of a society for the future. Since the present discussion is largely concerned with the mechanisms of the process, a discussion on the moral justification of it will not be undertaken.

<sup>6</sup> Lucian Pye, "Introduction", in Political Culture and Political Development, ed. Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965).





## CHAPTER 1 . IDEOLOGY

Around the early 1960's political scientists found themselves in the midst of a heated debate provoked by the publication of Daniel Bell's book, The End of Ideology.<sup>1</sup> Even now it almost seems as though the debate centered upon the notion involved in the title of the book, rather than on its content; for instance, Chaim Waxman's 1968 reader,<sup>2</sup> a gathering of the main pro and con arguments, shows clearly that few of the debators agreed on a) the meaning of the term (Bell's or their own) or, b) on the direction of the author's argument (to which many have added their own perceptions or critiques). In this context, it is not surprising that the debate, though less fiery, is still unresolved; the term "ideology" is still used within a broad and varied range of meanings. Since the discussion will return to both the debated arguments and Bell's original comment, suffice it to mention here that a primary conceptual distinction of meaning with respect to "ideology" regards "content" versus "function" ideology.

Today, in its common usage, "ideology" has come to denote a) a doctrinaire, totalitarian system of beliefs or ideas that are, b) built and used by Machiavellians to enslave and control a group of people. Thus the term has a derogatory, negative connotation, in terms of both content and function, for it is held to exist (and be

<sup>1</sup> rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

<sup>2</sup> Chaim Waxman, ed., The End of Ideology Debate (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968).



viable only in) authoritarian regimes, and is thus contrary to tenets of democratic liberalism. Yet this very much battered term started out as something totally different from what it has become.

In a sense, what Destutt de Tracy <sup>3</sup> named "ideology" was a method of analysis; the "idea" connotation came from the particular French school of thought that held the science of ideas to be fundamental for, and need to exist prior to, any other science of society. In one sense, the idéologues were philosophers, for they hoped that the new science of ideas, the establishment of clear, incisive, and universally accepted methods of analysis would lead them away from the quagmires of older philosophical approaches, at the same time that it would give men a greater chance to understand and live peacefully with one another. As Willard Mullins notes, ideology "did not refer to a quality or type of truth, but to a technique for discovering truth and dissolving illusions." <sup>5</sup> Yet the idéologues were also pragmatists, and tried to incorporate their science of ideas into France's educational system; it is this aspect of their pragmatism that turned Napoleon's scorn upon them. For, historical circumstances at the time demanded that France rally around her leader (read: fervent nationalism was called for) while the idéologues' scientific approach--to questions such as statehood and nation--implied less strictness in any definition, and more tolerance of other peoples and nations. Napoleon himself chastized the new school

<sup>3</sup> See for instance the discussion on the beginnings of the word in "Introduction", Judith Shklar, ed., Political Theory and Ideology (New York: Macmillan, 1966) or George Lichtheim, The Concept of Ideology (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), pp. 1-11, passim.

<sup>4</sup> Willard Mullins, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science", APSR, 66, No. 2 (June 1972), 499.





along these lines in 1812, after the French defeat in Russia. And from that point on, says Richard Cox, "the original, strictly theoretical meaning was now joined by a profoundly political meaning: 'ideology' is a visionary, abstract type of theorizing which is intent on utterly overturning political practice by subverting the settled opinions of men." <sup>5</sup>

It was Karl Marx, however, who started the trend mentioned by Cox, and gave the term wider currency in that context. Shklar notes that "the main struggle over the significance of ideology . . . is . . . a part of the most serious philosophical disagreements about the structure and meaning of human history. It is, above all, concerned with the place of ideas in the shaping of mankind's social development and, more particularly, the role of political ideas." <sup>6</sup> And it is, by and large, with Marx that the struggle begins, although Marx himself did not use the term "ideology" to a great extent--nor did he define it; he used it in conjunction with social or societal consciousness and, at times, employed the two terms interchangeably. It is thus perhaps more in retrospective that the concept of ideology may be said to acquire two more precisely political connotations in Marx's work. For one, as opposed to the idéologues' universal design, Marx saw man's consciousness as being linked to a particular type or mode of production:

<sup>5</sup> Richard Cox, ed., Ideology, Politics and Political Theory (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1969), p. 14.

<sup>6</sup> Shklar, p. 1.



The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.--real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious experience, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and circumstances appear upside down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process. <sup>7</sup>

Thus ideology is conceived of as a class-bound phenomenon, with a parochial orientation. Yet within the same context, ideology may be seen as a means to the maintenance of the status quo--i.e., the particular mode of production--which would be the concern of the ruling class. Marx notes that the

phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. <sup>8</sup>

(Hence the concept of "false-consciousness" which Mannheim was to clarify later.) Thus while the process of ideology formation is real in itself, the material premises upon which it is built--and which are independent of man's consciousness--are false, because exploitative.

<sup>7</sup> Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, ed. R. Pascal, (New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 14.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 14-15.





This is the beginning of the latter-day meaning of ideology in terms of a "tool" of class (or party, government) domination; the vague (possibility of) utilitarianism implied in the idéologues' significance of the term is emphasized in Marx's concept--and will be picked up by Lenin in even stronger terms. Yet before going on to more contemporary conceptions of political ideology, a brief look at Karl Mannheim is called for.

Mannheim's debt to Marx is obvious and, very much acknowledged by the author. Although his emphasis is on the sociology of knowledge rather than the political philosophy of history, he starts from a position that is, in theory, very close to Marx's: "In every concept, in every concrete meaning, there is contained a crystallization of the experiences of a certain group." <sup>9</sup> The loose implication of historical temporal, relativity of ideas with respect to a particular class or group will be strengthened (but not necessarily underlined) by Mannheim. The latter's definition of ideology differentiates between two types, the particular and the total conceptions of ideology. The "particular conception of ideology is implied when the term denotes that we are sceptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent;" <sup>10</sup> it is partial and operates at the psychological level. <sup>11</sup> In the "total" sense "we refer to the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group, e.g., of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of

<sup>9</sup> Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1936), p. 22.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 57.



this group." <sup>12</sup> This type of ideology "calls into question the opponent's total Weltanschauung" <sup>13</sup> and operates on the level of thought-systems. <sup>14</sup> The differentiation also implies that "the particular conception of ideology operates primarily with a psychology of interests, while the total conception uses a more formal functional analysis, without any reference to motivations." <sup>15</sup> Marx's concept of "false consciousness" is not forgotten either; yet in Mannheim's work it operates at a much more "objective" level. For instance, in writing about the two types of ideology, he notes that while the particular "assumes that this or that interest is the cause of a given lie or deception, the total presupposes simply that there is a correspondence between a given social situation and a given perspective, point of view, or apperception mass." <sup>16</sup> When he fuses the two concepts, Mannheim defines "false consciousness" as the "problem of the totally distorted mind which falsifies everything which comes within its range;" <sup>17</sup> and it is precisely at this point that one calls the opponent's views "ideology." <sup>18</sup> Thus

<sup>12</sup> Mannheim, p. 56.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 57-58.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 58.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 69.





ideology, over time, has acquired a connotation of bias; as well, the concept of "false consciousness" has "transferred its search for the criterion of reality to the realm of practice and particularly political practice." <sup>19</sup>

The criterion for determining what an ideology (as opposed to utopia) is, is its degree of realization. For Mannheim,

Ideologies are the situationally transcendent ideas which never succeed de facto in the realization of their projected contents. Though they often become the good-intentioned motives for the subjective conduct of the individual, when they are actually embodied in practice their meanings are most frequently distorted. <sup>20</sup>

Ideas which later turned out to have been only distorted representations of a past or potential social order were ideological, while those which were adequately realized in the succeeding social order were relative utopias. <sup>21</sup>

A simplified scheme of Mannheim's ideas is most commonly found under the following format: 1) ideologies are geared towards the maintenance of the status quo, while utopias generate change; 2) ideology conceals reality.

If one were to use Mannheim's terms, the concept of ideology would have to acquire a precise direction, status quo maintenance; because of the way in which the meaning of the term has evolved, this notion is difficult to accept, for ideologies in the 1970's may imply both maintenance of the status quo and change. Yet by the same evolutionary process, there is no doubt that ideology has been and

<sup>19</sup> Mannheim, p. 94.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 194.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 204.



is still used as a reality-making tool, even if by "reality-making" one understands simply a reinterpretation of the situation, a different view of reality, imposed by the ideology. Also, in Mannheim's terms, what seems to have survived is the total, as opposed to the particular, concept of ideology.

The French idéologues gave the term "ideology" a strictly analytical meaning; Napoleon, through the battle he waged against them, transformed the meaning of the term into a "political-thought-and-tool" concept. Marx used it on two levels, both as a tool concept and as an analytical link in the man-history-idea philosophy; his meaning is both universal and parochial--in the sense that it is both philosophical and class-bound--and belongs to both an analysis of history and a polemic, political, doctrine. Mannheim emphasized the weapon and the deceit dimensions of the concept; his meaning operates on two levels as well--the more philosophical sociology of knowledge and the psychological dimensions of perception. The alternate existence of different meanings of the term, and their blurring, says Cox, "reflect the two persistent conflicts which gave rise to them: the philosophical conflict concerning the nature and status of theory; and the political conflict concerning the effects of theory on political practice." <sup>22</sup> It is towards the latter, political and pragmatic aspect that the meaning of "ideology" has emphatically shifted. Along these lines, Judith Shklar sums up the transition of the metaphysical to the political in the following manner:

<sup>22</sup> Cox, p. 91.



As the label "the age of ideology" implies, nineteenth-century social thinking was in many ways, entirely novel. In its relentless future-directed, prophetic, activist and all-encompassing pretensions, its pseudoscientific aspirations and its dogmatic ways, the typical system of ideas of that century was quite unlike the political theory that preceded it. . . . What made the last century so evidently "an age of ideology" was the way in which political ideas became a part of the new forms of political combat . . . These were but a part of the novel political institutions and forms of government in which the mobilization of public opinion and the organization of political parties and groups played so paramount a part.<sup>23</sup>

It is almost a tragic irony of meaning that the "ideology" which the idéologues hoped would make men more tolerant of each other would be used a century later to express their intolerance and inability to communicate with one another.

Implicitly, Shklar has also pointed out a difference between political theory and ideology. From a historical point of view, it is probably with the Marxian analysis that the distinction became clearer--although one is not quite sure that even today all agree on a) the distinction and b) the various definitions of the terms. At the highest intellectual level stands political philosophy; the middle layer may be said to be occupied by political theory, which forms the link between the metaphysics of political philosophy and the political action direction aspect of ideology. Alan Gewirth has defined political philosophy as "the moral evaluation of political power";<sup>24</sup> Reo Christenson et al. define political theory as a "set of empirically

<sup>23</sup> Shklar, p. 19.

<sup>24</sup> Alan Gewirth, Political Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 1.





validated, logically ordered, and functionally related propositions about the actual political behavior of men and societies." <sup>25</sup> And ideologies . . . one could easily take one's pick from at least two dozen definitions, all more or less formal, more or less functional, or utilitarian, or dogmatic, or otherwise oriented towards intellect, emotion, sociology or politics. Thus far along in its chronological progression, a definition of the concept might run along the lines of a system of ideas characteristic of a social group, a system of ideas which may be used as a political weapon. To make the above distinction between the three concepts and levels serves primarily to narrow the concept of ideology; it does not, by any means, suggest a denial of the interrelationship that exists between them, but it does attempt to suggest that on a metaphysical-thought-physical-behavior continuum, ideology would be closest to actual action and farthest from ideas.

Both Cox and Shklar mentioned above the debate on the role of ideas in the political life of man; this has led to a great proliferation of writing on the subject of the concept of ideology. To attempt to sum it up would be a lengthy process and thus a few highlights may suffice here to show the many varied directions and approaches taken by various writers.

Giovanni Sartori <sup>26</sup> has differentiated between ideology in knowledge, which concerns itself with actual values such as truth, and

<sup>25</sup> Reo Christenson, et al., Ideologies and Modern Politics (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1971) p. 7.

<sup>26</sup> Giovanni Sartori, "Politics, Ideology and Belief Systems", APSR, 63, No. 2 (June 1969), pp. 398-411.



ideology in politics, which concerns itself with functional values such as persuasion power; he has then analysed the latter in terms of structures of thought. Sartori's concepts of ideological cognitive (versus affective) aspects are picked up by both Robert Merelman<sup>27</sup> and Harold Walsby<sup>28</sup> to examine the process of ideological individual development; while Merelman deals with levels of socialization, Walsby's concern is layers of thought. Along the lines of cognition versus affect, Patrick Corbett<sup>29</sup> examines the rationality versus emotion content and structure of ideologies, in particular totalitarian ones. In his definition of ideology David Minar<sup>30</sup> distinguishes between content, or structure, function and locus, and relates the concepts to behavior; Franz Schurman<sup>31</sup> distinguishes total (pure, theory) from particular (practical thought) ideology. On another level, Clifford Geertz<sup>32</sup> has examined the relationship between ideology and cultural blueprints in particular times of crisis and change.

Aside from being illustrative of various approaches to the

<sup>27</sup> Robert Merelman, "The Development of Political Ideology", APSR, 63, No. 3 (September 1969), pp. 750-767.

<sup>28</sup> Harold Walsby, The Domain of Ideologies (Glasgow: MacLellan, 1947).

<sup>29</sup> Patrick Corbett, Ideologies (London: Hutchinson, 1965).

<sup>30</sup> D. Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior", MJPS, 5, No. 4 (November 1961), pp. 317-331.

<sup>31</sup> Franz Schurmann, "Ideology", in Contemporary Analytical Theory, ed. David Apter and Charles Andrain (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

<sup>32</sup> Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a cultural System", in Apter & Andrain.





concept of ideology, the foregoing is also a partial sample of the "end of ideology" debate. But before turning to that modern phase, it must be noted that most of the above mentioned writers as well as some others do agree on one point--that ideology, from having been an "analytical" idea about ideas, has acquired a very specific, political tool connotation. And the upheavals of the twentieth century have had much to do with this.

With the advent of the Russian Revolution and the emergence of fascism, the concept of ideology--that is, the (false) set of ideas representing the interests of a social group which form a system that could be used as a political weapon--picked up another dimension, that of behavior expressing it. V. I. Lenin, for instance, wrote that since

there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working masses themselves in the process of their movement, the only choice is--either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind has not created a "third" ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or an above-class ideology). Hence, to belittle the socialist ideology in any way, to turn aside from it in the slightest degree means to strengthen bourgeois ideology. 33

In a sense, ideology became a set of ideas, characteristic of a certain social group, that was used as a political tool to influence, to be the motor force of, the actions of a certain other group of people. Also, for Lenin, spontaneity, the arising of a "consciousness" from a changed mode of economic production, held no future--perhaps he believed less in the (loose concept of) "masses" than Marx did. Lenin

33 V. I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done? rpt. 1961, (New York: International Publishers, 1969), pp. 40-41, emphasis in original.



notes that

it is possible to "raise the activity of the working masses" only when this activity is not restricted to "political agitation on an economic basis". A basic condition for the necessary expansion of political agitation is the organization of comprehensive political exposure. In no way except by means of such exposures can the masses be trained in political consciousness and revolutionary activity. <sup>34</sup>

His view of the masses and the commitment to raising the class consciousness of the working mass leads Lenin to tactical conclusions that imply the creation of the vanguard party and the importance of educational propaganda and agitation by the agents of the party:

Only a gross failure to understand Marxism . . . could prompt the opinion that the rise of a mass, spontaneous working-class movement relieves us of the duty of creating as good an organization of revolutionaries as the Zemlya Volya had . . . On the contrary, this movement imposes the duty upon us; for the spontaneous struggle of the proletariat will not become its genuine "class struggle" until this struggle is led by a strong organization of revolutionaries. <sup>35</sup>

Lenin's contribution to the development of the concept of ideology is important, for much of today's meaning stems from his conception. He emphasized the weapon-function dimension of the concept, while also making it the privileged tool of a certain group, strictly differentiated from that of another group/class--and thereby introduced the dimension of exclusiveness that exists today. He also gave ideology the totalitarian connotation it now has, by pointing out that "political" concepts such as ideology operate in a total societal context. Lenin, to a large extent, also created the ideological "we-

<sup>34</sup> Lenin, pp. 68-69, emphasis in original.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 132, emphasis in original.



they" dichotomy, whereby, as Christenson et al. point out, ideologies are formed by selective and subjective interpretation.<sup>36</sup>

It is not surprising, in this context, to read of "totalitarian" ideologies. For just as political culture is only a part of the general culture, so political ideas are only one aspect of the societal mind; thus, confronted with the image, real or suggested, of a "they" enemy, the whole of society, man's behavior and values, must be protected. Friedrich and Brzezinski define these ideologies as "essentially action-related systems of ideas. They typically contain a program and a strategy for its realization and their essential purpose is to unite organizations which are built around them."<sup>37</sup> True enough, this meaning of ideology switches the focus from position to function, from materialism to idealism; yet many have seen the switch as a result of a qualitative change in the conditions, the environment, in which ideologies operate--as, for instance, the division of the world in "enemy" camps, the communication explosion in the context of which values need more institutional help in order to survive, etc. John Dunn's observation on the nature of modern ideologies reflects some of these changes:

The real revolutionary ideologies in the world today are primitivist in inspiration . . . because the real revolutionary situations in the world today are primitive in character. Partly as a consequence, revolution is not authoritarian in manner, as Engels proclaimed and liberating in effect. It is authoritarian in manner and authoritarian in effect. It does not come, as Marx saw

<sup>36</sup> Christenson et al., pp. 4-5.

<sup>37</sup> Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Totalitarian Ideology" in Shklar, p. 123.





it, as a decisive summit of the development of civilisation, the coming of real equality to a society which need no longer suffer from real political problems and thus can be organized without needing to be hierarchical. Rather it comes in countries which have heard that material civilization is possible, but which feel that their leaders are failing to bring it. <sup>38</sup>

Developing countries find themselves in a position of economic underdevelopment and want; for them, totalitarian ideologies seem to promise the quicker way to "modernization", or at least a higher level of national affluence, because they propose government control over all aspects of society.

Yet many have pointed to the benefits of democratic ideologies rather than totalitarian ones; even more have declared the superior goodness and the human truth of the individualistic-libertarian ethic in terms of moral values. Louis Halle even confines the definition of ideology, as a concept, to

bodies of doctrine that present themselves as affording systems of belief so complete that whole populations may live by them alone, that are made known and interpreted by leaders ostensibly possessed of special genius or by organized elites not unlike priesthoods, that claim exclusive authority as representing something like revealed truth, and consequently require the suppression of whatever does not conform. . . . I am concerned here only with systems of beliefs that are implicitly totalitarian. <sup>39</sup>

In Halle's view, ideology excludes toleration; this parallels Bertrand Russell's proposition that an autocratic system can only exist

<sup>38</sup> John Dunn, Modern Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1972), pp. 22-23.

<sup>39</sup> Louis Halle, The Ideological Imagination (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972), p. 6.



unquestioned.<sup>40</sup> Like E. M. Forster, Halle believes that tolerance and the accommodation of diversity are a must in any society; thus the conformity demanded by (totalitarian) ideologies is both impossible and unacceptable. In Forster's view, individualism is a must, because man is born and dies alone; and because creativity, the "good" in man and society, dies in conformity. The dullness of conformity, says Forster, may be hidden for a time by hero-worship of the leader; but when the latter fails, he fails "with a completeness which no artist and no lover can experience, because with them the process of creation is itself an achievement, whereas with him the only possible achievement is success."<sup>41</sup> Bertrand Russell's argument against authoritarian systems is certainly germane to the above, although perhaps more skeptical; to Forster's enthusiastic belief in individualism and liberalism, he substitutes reasons for embracing empiricist liberalism. For him, it is not "worth while to inflict a comparatively certain present evil for the sake of a comparatively doubtful future good,"<sup>42</sup> because we are never certain of the course and of the future of most things; consequently Russell finds the dogmatism of authoritarianism (and the accompanying features of falsehoods, persecutions, etc.) morally unacceptable.

The above is an outline of the philosophical values contained

<sup>40</sup> Bertrand Russell, Philosophy and Politics (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1947).

<sup>41</sup> E. M. Forster, "What I Believe", in Two Cheers For Democracy (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1938), p. 73.

<sup>42</sup> Russell, p. 24.





in certain types of ideologies; in that context, it may be said to reflect primarily subjective, individual feelings--which this discussion is not concerned with. Yet viewed in a different manner, this value-content does not even pose a problem; for the defence of liberalism and individualism, in principle, is not inconsistent with the concept of ideology--rather, criticising totalitarian ideologies for being "unfree" as opposed to "free" democratic ideologies is a matter of failing to distinguish between overtness and latency.

The last question will, perhaps, become clearer further on, in the context of the "end of ideology" debate. The actual polemics of the battle, the Right and the Left of the intellectual spectrum pecking at each other are not very relevant in this context and thus will be left out. It should be pointed out, however, that Bell's starting comment concerned the end of content-ideology in the West and the rise of function-ideology in the rest of the world. Thus the emphasis is away from universal, general, normative, socio-cultural schemes that form coherent conceptual wholes, and towards more parochial, tactical schemes of social, political, economic, advancement or change. Bell himself has pointed out that in

the distinctive difference between the two kinds of ideologies lies the great political and social problems of the second half of the twentieth century. The ideologies of the nineteenth century were universalistic, humanistic, and fashioned by intellectuals. The mass ideologies of Asia and Africa are parochial, instrumental, and created by political leaders. The driving forces of the old ideologies were social equality and, in the largest sense, freedom. The impulses of the new ideologies are economic development and national power. <sup>43</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Bell, p. 403.



If one concedes that the concern of nineteenth century ideologies was content, and that the concern of twentieth century ideologies is function, then the implication of the effect of the changing environment may have to be accepted as well. Supporting Bell's argument, Raymond Aron comments that while yesterday's ideologies were the "legacy of a century in which Europe was aware of the plurality of civilizations but did not doubt the universality of its message,"<sup>44</sup> today's ideologies operate in settings that have

the longing for a purpose, for communion with the people, for something controlled by an idea and a will. The feeling of belonging to the elect, the security provided by a closed system in which the whole of history as well as one's own person find their place and their meaning, the pride in joining the past to the future in present action...<sup>45</sup>

Within the context of twentieth century ideologies, another differentiation may be made between overt and latent manifestations of function-ideology. David Apter, for instance, notes that in the West, "ideology has changed considerably from the more dogmatic statements that periodically . . . heralded total solutions to world problems. Today our ideologies are disguised. Their language has changed. The utopian element has disappeared."<sup>46</sup> Nettl, as well, remarks that

ideology in the guise of no ideology at all, will find its reflection in a value system that is oriented towards the maintenance of certain fundamental institutions as the most important social task or purpose . . . Such a . . . value system may elude those observers who expect to see values concretely asserted.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Raymond Aron, "The End of the Ideological Age?", in Waxman, p. 37.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 46.

<sup>46</sup> Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 17, hereafter cited as Apter, Ideology...

<sup>47</sup> Nettl, p. 102.



Thus those writers who see the ideologies of the developing countries as something essentially novel, departing even from the totalitarian model, could perhaps look at these two related concepts of emphasis and degree of overtness. The "new" ideologies place more emphasis on the political weapon aspect; this leads to the concept of action as part of the definition. As well, they consciously extend the "false consciousness" concept so that a new reality is created--at first, only a mental perception then, hopefully, a material reality. The logic of the technical twentieth century justification for change in the definition of ideology holds only insofar as it has changed the orientation of emphasis from its content to its function and has legitimized its use as a weapon in a certain type of political situation; the logic also holds insofar as the extended communication network has pointed out to new nations that they lacked the attributes of "success".

In the distinction made above between the concepts of political philosophy, theory, and ideology, it was pointed out that ideology was closest to the behavioral effect of ideas; in another vein, it may be conceived of as a working scheme for a more philosophical concept, or an apparatus of translation of the latter into pragmatic terms. Thus "ideology is the conversion of ideas into social levers . . . truth arises in action and meaning is given to experience by the 'transforming moment'." <sup>48</sup> Ideology may also be defined as the "explicit and derivative articulation of political norms", <sup>49</sup> and, further, as "a pattern of ideas which simultaneously provides for its adherents:

<sup>48</sup> Bell, p. 400.

<sup>49</sup> Apter, The Politics . . ., p. 270, fn. 3.





1) a self-definition, 2) a description of the current situation, its background, and what is likely to follow, and 3) various imperatives which are 'deduced' from the foregoing." <sup>50</sup>

Thus, the working definition of ideology in the context of this discussion is an action-oriented set of descriptive and derivative patterns of ideas, geared towards change, wherein the important concepts are action-orientation and social levers of influence rather than the conceptual coherence or the ethical superiority of the set of ideas.

The foregoing historical presentation has shown progressive changes in the definitional context of "ideology" and has underlined two general and different conceptual manners of examination: the standpoint of content-ideology and that of function-ideology; yet while the differentiation seemed to be in order, it does not imply mutual exclusiveness by any means--but rather, a difference of emphasis on the importance of either. For instance, Lenin's above-mentioned emphasis on the need to use ideology as a tool of total control certainly did not exclude the need for a coherent system of ideas about the form of the future state; rather, perhaps because of the closer link with practice, it may have emphasized the need for a (narrower) contextually relevant working scheme for the future. Another distinction, related to the preceeding, was made between (latent) tacit and overt ideologies; along the way it may have become clear that debates on whether democracy is an ideology or not may belong in this particular context.

<sup>50</sup> Mary Matossian, "Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization", in Political Modernization, ed. Claude Welch (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1967), p. 323.



The above discussion has also attempted to arrive at a working definition of ideology in the context of the modern, sacred-collectivity, one-party mobilization systems under scrutiny. That definition, in terms of emphasis, stresses the function rather than the content of ideology; that is, less emphasis is placed on the Chinese versus the Tazanian versus the Cuban, etc. versions of justificatory explanations of the need to create the new man, and more on the fact that ideology is employed in all three systems to create him. Insofar as both content and function are concerned, overt rather than tacit ideology is referred to--in other words, the ideologies under discussion are overtly declared (by leaders, etc.) rather than tacitly held guidelines. Finally, the concept of ideology involved--partially in view of its primarily functional aspect--emphasizes the action-lever aspect, the persuasive possibilities of the (ideological) tool, whether that is activated through emotional appeals, institutions, or any other such channel.

Most writers agree that ideologies, especially those of the type described above, arise or are created in times of crisis; thus, it may be said that generally, crisis-conditions are both the origin and a characteristic of ideologies.<sup>51</sup> In this context, Eric Hoffer has noted that "a population subjected to drastic change is a population of misfits--unbalanced, explosive, and hungry for action. Action is the most obvious way by which to gain confidence and prove our worth, and it is also a reaction against loss of balance."<sup>52</sup> Within that context,

<sup>51</sup> See Christenson et al, *passim.*, and Mullins, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science".

<sup>52</sup> Eric Hoffer, The Ordeal of Change (New York: Harper Colophon Books, Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 2-3.





the general functions of political ideology, according to J. R. Nellis, are to

(1) rationalize the exercise of political power by a limited membership, and (2) legitimize the activity of the ruling regime by appeals to such authorities as religion, tradition, and in the present era, science. For new members of the group, the ideology serves as a socializing agent, not simply to the goals of the organization, but to the internal norms of the organization itself.<sup>53</sup>

Apter also notes that there are two functions, "one directly social, binding the community together, and the other individual, organizing the role personalities of the maturing individual;"<sup>54</sup> for him, the function of solidarity combines with the identity aspect to legitimize authority. Christensen et al. find that ideology has five functions in that it provides: a cognitive structure, a prescriptive formula, a tool of conflict management and integration, a tool for self-identification, and acts as a dynamic force that results in a commitment to action; yet the sum total of the above is still legitimization of the new systems and patterns of authority. As the authors point out:

The creators and advocates of political ideology, most importantly, seek belief and action. They seek commitment to the ideology and its consequences: followers who identify their lives with it, accept its tenets, and work loyally for it. Ideology usually exercises a strong emotional appeal . . . The power of an ideology derives . . . from the human energies it unleashes. Political ideology, therefore, is aimed at directly influencing political behavior . . .

<sup>53</sup> "The Ideology of Rapid Development", (Program of Eastern African Studies, Occasional Paper No. 28, Syracuse Univ., 1967), p. 20.

<sup>54</sup> Apter, Ideology..., p. 18.



As ideas-in-action political ideologies are attached to corporate political bodies--organized movements, groups, parties. <sup>55</sup>

Also as "ideas-in-action" ideologies serve a very important purpose, mentioned above as socialization--that is, making individuals into social beings and thereby creating legitimacy in the new context. For, as Christenson et al. point out,

(e)very society is invaded from within by successive waves of barbarians--new generations who must be taught appropriate social behavior. It is through ideology that new members are instilled with the ideas and ideals that define permitted and prohibited goals and expectations, that create feelings of common identification and allegiance, that anchor members in the social order, and that build and sustain a nation. Ideology, then, is the code of induction into society, with socialization as the means of induction. <sup>56</sup>

Clearly, then, ideology operates very close to the societal setting; more precisely, it acts on the particular (political) culture to shape mould, change it. In the words of Léon Dion,

ideology is a cultural and mental complex which mediates between the norms associated with given social attitudes and conduct and the norms which the political institutions and mechanisms tend to crystallize and propagate. In other terms, political ideology is a more or less integrated system of values and norms, rooted in society, which individuals and groups project on the political plane in order to promote the aspirations and ideals they have come to value in social life.

Yet if individuals have come to value certain ideals, that is only because society socializes its members into certain patterns, etc.,

<sup>55</sup> Christenson et al., p. 6.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>57</sup> Léon Dion, "An Hypothesis Concerning the Structure and Function of Ideology", in Cox, p. 318.



either through the political culture--theoretically, covertly--or through the ideological apparatus--institutional or emotional. It is to the "setting" of ideology, political culture, that the discussion now turns.





## CHAPTER 11

### POLITICAL CULTURE, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP WITH IDEOLOGY

The introduction of this paper cautioned against a discussion of the merits or deficiencies of the concept of "political" culture; it was assumed that the concept may be valid at the analytical level. Yet two very important factors mitigate against taking too narrow an approach to the concept. For one thing, the systems under discussion here have been termed more or less totalitarian, in the sense of attempting to control as much of man's thought and behavior as possible; along these lines, every aspect of social and individual life works to support and reinforce others. Thus the line between what is "political" and what is not is almost non-existent. The second argument lies very much along the same lines and concerns writings about political culture. When writers examine latent, non-political socialization in the family structure as it reflects upon the individual's attitudes towards the political system, or study personality structures as being more supportive of X rather than Y types of political systems, they draw away from the "political" to a considerable degree; true enough, they are examining "political" consequences, but with an eye to non-political causes or origins. Thus, while using the analytical concept of "political" culture, it may be wise to stay away from too rigid a definition of it, especially in the area of political socialization. In the ultimate analysis,



political culture is a very vague, amorphous term--whose vagueness is not due to a lack of definition, but rather to the breadth of concept necessitated by the functions political culture performs.

Political culture has been defined in various ways; the difference lies in the particular definition of culture used by the authors. Gabriel Almond and Verba's definition "refers to the specifically political orientations--attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system."<sup>1</sup> The key word in this definition is "orientations" and the authors make it clear that the meaning assigned to culture in this context is psychological.<sup>2</sup> (It is easy to see how the legitimacy and identity functions of ideology congrue with such a definition of political culture.) Somewhat more removed from the purely psychological orientations is Verba's definition of political culture as "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place."<sup>3</sup> Pye adds that this definition "encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity" because it is "the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the individuals who constantly make up the system; thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experiences."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, abr. ver. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965), p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>3</sup> Pye and Verba, p. 513.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 8.





For most of the "traditional" writers on political culture, the concept may be defined as a set of "attitudes, sentiments and cognitions that inform and govern political behavior in any society." <sup>5</sup> This definition neither stresses nor deemphasizes the importance of such aspects of political culture as societal role perceptions, or psychological orientations to authority.

Political scientists such as Almond, David Easton, and Pye, have been criticized for the emphasis they place on psychological orientations. More "modern" writers--perhaps because they also support the action-lever, functional-tool view of ideology--take a more functional-behavioral view of political culture. Nettl, for instance, defines it as "the conditioning element of action" <sup>6</sup> and contrasts it with a definition of ideology as "the product of action, in combination with cultural influence." <sup>7</sup> The shift away from psychological orientation is also, in large part, due to these writers' concern with culture change as opposed to the traditional writers' preoccupation with the mechanics of status quo support. Culture change is one of the goals of the newly developing states; as Dennis Kavanagh points out

{w}hat is interesting about the politics of many new states today, however, is the explicit nature of their efforts to transform the political culture. Few political leaders, committed to speedy industrialization or political modernization, are prepared to rely on indigenous values;

<sup>5</sup> Pye and Verba, p. 7.

<sup>6</sup> Nettl, p. 27.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.



changes in personality and culture are widely regarded as preconditions of political and socio-economic change. . . .

Reconstruction of the political culture looms large in many new states for four major reasons. Firstly, if culture change is to be effected speedily, it will have to be directed by the state--usually by means of secondary and formal agencies. Secondly, the scope of politics is large in such states; society becomes identified with the state, the good man or citizen is the good party man. Thirdly, given the recent discontinuities in the histories of many new states, the creation of new attitudes is important in weakening the pre-revolutionary or pre-independence outlooks. New orientations are necessary to support new institutions and new forms of activity. Finally, the internalization of regime-approved norms and values is important in strengthening the regime's legitimacy and in encouraging voluntary compliance with its commands.<sup>8</sup>

Within that context, mobilization for participation is the first priority. Nettl defines mobilization as "essentially (1) attitudinal--a commitment to action, and (2) a means of translating this commitment into action or observed behavior."<sup>9</sup> The stress on observed behavior rather than psychological orientations is emphasized by both Richard Fagen and Nettl in the context of the new states.

For Nettl, in

countries where mobilization is deliberate, where we have a commitment to compression of time and social distance, where one of the main functions of politics is the rapid involvement of peripheral members of society, it is easier to view mobilization as a deliberate process and to regard it as in a large part aimed at culture formation.<sup>10</sup>

Along the same lines, participatory, observable behavior is stressed by Fagen because it may lead to change in the political culture; he

<sup>8</sup> Dennis Kavanagh, Political Culture (London: Macmillan Papermac, 1972), p. 40.

<sup>9</sup> Nettl, p. 33.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 70.



notes that

participatory activity--not in itself dependent on the internalization of new norms--may eventually lead to very basic changes in the value and belief systems of those who are swept into participation. In this manner, easy formulas such as "attitudes shape behavior" or "behavior shapes attitudes" give way to a system that is organized to sustain a dynamic relation between behavioral change and attitudinal change.<sup>11</sup>

As the authors point out, the newer, more behavior-oriented approach does not negate or overlook the psychological orientations--in fact, it is just as concerned with building new attitudes; but the difference lies in starting from a context of culture change--and thus, stressing the means whereby the new orientations might be inculcated. Nettl also notes that "there may be rapid shifts in transfer of allegiance, and substitution of one legitimate authority for another, in periods of great social change. These are better viewed in the context of participation and allegiance than in terms of culture levels (or even culture quality)."<sup>12</sup> The above indicates the newer writers' perception of political socialization; this perception differs from the more traditional view in a manner parallel to the diverging opinions about political culture. This latter differentiation almost parallels the content-function dichotomy observed above with respect to the evolution of the concept of "ideology"; in both cases the stress is away from content and on function.

<sup>11</sup> Richard Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1969), p. 10, hereafter cited as Fagen, The Transformation....

<sup>12</sup> Nettl, p. 62.





Political socialization is so very closely linked with political culture because it is a) the means of induction into political culture,<sup>13</sup> b) the means of passing the political culture on to a future generation,<sup>14</sup> and c) also the tool of political culture change.<sup>15</sup> Political socialization is both a social process and an individual, psychological-identification or role learning process.<sup>16</sup>

Most writers agree on the definition of ideology only at the above level of generality. From there on, differences arise as to the content of the transmission, the emphases placed on the various agents of socialization, and the importance ratio of various stages or levels of the process. Generally, there are three approaches to political socialization: learning theory--which explains political behavior through societal training--personality theory--which explains political behavior through individual personality conformation--and role theory--which explains political behavior through perceptions of societal "ought". None of the three are claimed to be more complete or superior analytical tools; psychological personality theory, however, is difficult to apply on a nation-wide scale and may be better reserved for case studies. This restriction is, partially, due to the

<sup>13</sup> Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1960), p. 27.

<sup>14</sup> Kenneth Langton, Political Socialization (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), p. 4.

<sup>15</sup> Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), p. 64.

<sup>16</sup> For instance, Richard Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1969), pp. 13, 37; Langton, pp. 4, 8.



individual psychological method it uses; as well, this approach is often concerned with personality types<sup>17</sup> rather than with the social individuals who are the focus of this discussion. It may also be argued that, on a larger scale, role theory as defined above could easily be included in the more comprehensive learning theory. Within this context, latent and manifest, political and non-political, manners of socialization are differentiated; the four types are largely applicable to all the agents of socialization. At the same time, the agents themselves may be classified as primary--such as the family and the school--or secondary--such as peer groups, later school, work, and social group experiences, the mass media, political parties, etc.

In terms of "totalitarian", modernizing systems, that "politicize" all aspect of social life, that profess an overt ideology geared to action and change in political culture, the socialization process may be different than that of a libertarian-democratic, "modern" system that operates on a latent ideology, with a view to status quo maintenance. Three of the more important differences are a) the degree of overttness in and about the process, b) the degree of importance attached to the various socializing agents in the system, and c) a preoccupation with the originator or the agent of socialization rather than with the learning experience of the subjects. For instance, a now much criticized<sup>18</sup> view of the manner of perceiving socialization held that the early influence of the family--through which much of the

<sup>17</sup> See, for instance, Fred Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969).

<sup>18</sup> For instance, Langton, and Orville Brim Jr. and Stanton Wheeler, Socialization After Childhood (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966).





political culture is held to be transmitted--was the sieve through which all later experiences were sifted; the more recent writings (and, apparently, the leaders of new states) seem to take the view that socialization is a continuous, life-long, cumulative process, in which all factors are equally important. Related to the above is the fact that more attention is now being paid to socialization through behavior, as opposed to the more traditional examination of psychological attitude and belief formation in the subject socialized.

It was mentioned above that one of the main purposes of ideology (in the type of system discussed) was to change the political culture through socialization; political socialization, in turn, was seen to be both the transmitter and the transformer of the political culture which, itself, gives birth to, and is affected by, ideology. Thus political socialization appears to be the linking factor in the interrelationship between political culture and ideology; a discussion of some of the dynamics of the process, which follows below, will also complete the discussion of political socialization, since at least the agents of socialization will be involved in it. But before turning to the relationship, it may be useful to attempt to distinguish, to a greater degree, political culture from ideology. Thus a comparison of the two follows, based on: source, life-span, homogeneity, role, function, and aspects.

The first criterion of comparison is the respective sources of the two terms discussed. It has been mentioned above that political cultures have roots in the very existence and subsequent experiences of both the system and its members, while ideologies do not occur, but are willfully created for definite purposes. The life-spans of



ideologies and political cultures reflect the differences noted with regard to sources. Ideologies are short-lived, for they are functional tools; once their role is fulfilled, they must change, or else become obstructions rather than building blocks. Their very "modernizing" natures make them obsolete at a certain point, unless there is no political development--a situation that is pretty well impossible, at least in the type of system under discussion. Political cultures, on the contrary, have long-life-spans; traditionally conservative, they react negatively to attempts at change. They also require time to change, once the initial penetration is made, because they affect the emotional, deeply-instilled responses of man.

Homogeneity is the next criterion of differentiation. Political cultures are heterogeneous because of such factors as the "imperfections of the processes of political socialization, personal preferences, and the limitations in intelligence or opportunities." <sup>19</sup> Also to be mentioned is the fact that political cultures operate largely on emotional, subconscious individual levels, which contributes to the creation of heterogenous cultures, largely made up of subcultures. Ideologies, on the other hand, must, by their nature as functional tools (in the type of system discussed), provide a cohesive, integrated, logically-sequential pattern that leaves little room for questioning; this is closely related to the perception of the role ideologies play in these systems, which is summarized below.

The role of ideology is manifold. Generally speaking, it has been noted that it hastens modernization of the system and gives it

<sup>19</sup> Almond and Verba, p. 19.



directions and priorities. More specifically, as noted above, ideologies legitimize and rationalize a particular distribution of power in the different stages of modernization of the state. This is usually achieved by providing the government (or the Party, etc.,) with a transcendental, moral, significance, with philosophical bases; it is the ideology's role to translate this into simpler and more personal terms than those of the political philosophy. The role of political culture may be perceived as that of a restrainer; that is, if, as Nettl pointed out above, ideology is the "product of action and its object" while political culture is "the conditioning element of action", then, while ideology determines which alternatives to choose in a given situation, political culture determines the range of alternatives perceived.

The functions of political culture, as pointed out by Almond and Coleman are: interest articulation and aggregation, political communications, recruitment and socialization.<sup>20</sup> The main functions of ideology are integration and mobilization; in the type of system discussed, the functions of ideology include the functions of political culture. The dual process is due primarily to the situation of change, which in many ways implies a battle between the ideology and the political culture of the system.

Ideology, as is easily seen from various above definitions, has the following aspects: it provides a clarification of goals, it describes trends in respect to which goal values are achieved, it provides an analysis of the conditioning factors and a projection of future developments and an (inventive) evaluation of policy

<sup>20</sup> Almond and Coleman, p. 17.





alternatives.<sup>21</sup> The aspects of political culture, as suggested by Harold and Margaret Sprout are: a) normative, notions of what is right--or judgments and opinions, b) cognitive, knowledge and belief of existing reality, and c) affective, or emotional responses.<sup>22</sup>

Having thus differentiated the two concepts, the discussion may now turn to the interrelationship between political culture, ideology and political socialization. This process may be examined in three general and interrelated manners; the three differ, respectively, insofar as they focus on a) socialization, b) ideology, or c) culture change. Two cautionary remarks may be in order here; one, that the three standpoints are interrelated to a degree which may make a strict separation not only difficult, but also dysfunctional, and, two, that the following "treatment" does not by any means claim to be comprehensive.

Ideology has been defined above as an action level, or the product of action combined with cultural influences; it was seen to act on both the emotional, affective level and an institutionalized (that is, in terms of behavior related to and conditioned by, structures and organizations) level. Political culture was termed the conditioning element of action, insofar as it includes existential and normative belief systems, values, and attachments, commitments,

<sup>21</sup> Arnold Rogow and Harold Lasswell, Power, Corruption and Rectitude (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 120-121.

<sup>22</sup> Harold and Margaret Sprout, "A Functional Approach to National Character", in Politics and the International System, ed. Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1969).



and symbols of an emotional type. Political socialization was seen to be the systemic link between ideology and culture, since it is one of the ends of the former as well as the transmitter or transformer of the latter.

Political socialization has been examined largely under two main headings: stages of formation of political orientations and agents that shape these attitudes. If one views the stages as a process and the agents as the structure, a very tidy model suggests itself in the following form. The process would cover latent, non-political socialization, transmitting such symbolic types of culture as myth, ritual, and symbols themselves, while the structure would be explicable in terms of overt, political, socialization of the type performed by such institutions as the school, or a political party. The fault of the above scheme is its tidiness and simplicity. For one thing, symbolic and institutional, overt and latent, political and non-political, are analytical distinctions of sets that in reality are difficult to distinguish and that, moreover, act to reinforce each other; secondly, the problem of fitting an ideology of the type discussed into the above scheme makes it unworkable, for ideology might well be substituted for political socialization at every step.

Another manner of viewing political socialization is to see the stages of development in congruence with the agents that act at the different stages of the subject's development, according to age. Thus one would examine first and foremost the influence of the family on a pre-schooler, the influence of the school at the next stage--in terms of both latent and overt socialization--then peer group affect, university or work-place experiences, interaction with the later social





group to which the individual has attached himself, etc., while keeping watch throughout on the influence of the mass media. The difficulty with this approach is that it does not "fit" either the type of system examined here--approximate total politicization--or the kind of ideology found in it--geared towards total, political mobilization for rapid economic and social change.

Perhaps, then, political socialization may have to be regarded, in the context of the systems examined, as an agent of the ideologies of rapid change; its agents, in a similar manner, will be those that best serve as the means to the ideological ends. True enough, if this scheme is followed, then everything that the ideology recommends, institutionalizes, pronounces, becomes political socialization; yet that is exactly what should be expected to happen in a system that has to sustain itself through continuous politicization, and attempts to change man through control of this thought and behavior--since, as pointed above, the overt and latent do interact to a large degree.

Ideological political socialization--for lack of a better term--may be seen to manifest itself in two general manners, symbolic and institutional, that are closely interrelated and mutually affective. For instance, ideologies usually create myths and rituals which the socialization process institutionalizes, along with the system's symbols; yet at the same time, the system (leaders, party) may invest a particular organization with the symbolic value of a myth, thereby reinforcing the socialization process. Thus most organizations in this type of system will have a symbolic value that is, in most cases, much stronger, much more effective (in an affective manner) than a simple recognition of the organization's real functional value;



for instance, the system's main socialization agents--the party organization and its various appendices, the educational system and the mass media--all are imbued with a "higher-good" value than might be expected of leadership, learning, and information channels. In this way, myths, symbols, rituals are very much socializing agents--insofar as they transmit and reinforce certain values through the above-mentioned agents--while being an actual part of the ideology; as well, ideology itself, while being the guiding force, is also--through the same agents, especially the media--a socializing agent itself. As well, and consequently, in this all-directed context, there are few daily experiences of man that are not meaningfully and symbolically related to an ideological explanation, justification, of the "good society" that is the ultimate end.

In terms of effective mobilization and recruitment--and also legitimization and integration--the symbolic part of ideological socialization is much more effective than the institutional part, because it touches at the level of emotions, feelings, fears--in general, the level of subconscious responses. Murray Edelman, to whom much credit is due for stressing the importance of symbolic meanings and interactions, notes in his The Symbolic Uses of Politics that there are three primary reasons for the strong effect of symbols and emotional interaction:

- 1) People read their own meaning into situations that are unclear or provocative of emotion. . . . .
- 2) It is characteristic of large numbers of people in our society that they see and think in terms of stereotypes, personalization, and oversimplifications, that they cannot recognize or tolerate ambiguous and complex situations, and that they accordingly respond chiefly to symbols that oversimplify and distort. . . . .



3) Emotional commitment to a symbol is associated with contentment and quiescence regarding problems that would otherwise arouse concern.<sup>23</sup>

Generally, Edelman sees acts--ritual, symbolic action, leadership style--settings (for the ritual political action) and speeches (in terms of the affective appeal of the language used) as being the main "symbolic uses of politics." As indicated above, imbuing organizations with a higher political symbolic value is one other use that would have to be added to Edelman's general list, in light of the particular types of systems discussed here.

The above-mentioned institutional agents of socialization are much more readily observable than the symbolic ones; they have not, however, been elaborated on simply because they do not acquire a meaning in the system until they, too, become symbolic. In other words, even if one accepts the above observation that ideologies may attempt to socialize through participation, it is still a question of having symbolically meaningful, affective participation that will reinforce values propagated through other channels and agents of socialization. For instance, membership in the political party of the system does not mean just joining the political leadership (since the systems are one-party types) but also entering into a higher, superior entity, that is driven by morally superior, loftier goals as compared to those of the ordinary citizen; it may also be seen as joining the almost legendary (since history usually starts with the revolution) group of people that brought about the revolution, independence, etc., and who are also going to lead the nation towards the ideal state.

<sup>23</sup> (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 30-32.





Insofar as they are socializing agents, these organizations are structured for maximum penetration, and for easy ideological manipulation. The structure and characteristics of the political party in one-party systems--grass-roots, small cell organization, strict chain of command hierarchy--have been given wide coverage in political science literature; thus an elaboration of this point may be omitted from the present discussion. It is noteworthy, however, that this type of party performs double duty; thus while it functions as the government of the country, it is also an ideological teacher and mobilizer. Auxiliary bodies of the party, such as youth, and women's groups, city or rural district organizations, social, leisure, and occupational organizations are attempts to reach non-party members and incorporate them into the process of socialization. The educational system includes both the youth's school education and adult education, and incorporates in both overt, political, socialization; it teaches the idea-explanation content of the ideology and, where possible, shows or puts into practice certain of its tenets--working in the fields in a case where the ideology stresses the value of manual work might be such an example. The ideology per se is being taught by the party, the school, the university, the work-group and other mass organizations. It is also largely diffused through another governmental agent of political education, the mass media. The media are also, probably, a stronger carrier of symbolic messages than either of the above two agents because, in order to make the ideology fit for mass consumption, they must simplify and sloganize it. Finally, the main socializing agent in Western society, the family, is deemphasized in mobilizing systems because, as



mentioned above, it is the main carrier of the traditional political culture which the ideology is attempting to change; thus children, at the age when they might be picking up familial attitudes and orientations, are socialized by nurseries, kindergartens, etc., that are more easily manipulable by the ideology and for the ideological value-inculcation.

The above is only a partial view of the mechanics of socialization with ideological control. The tie with political culture is suggested by the question of building the new man to fit the new system--thus, the change in political culture. The question here is not, really, whether the change is possible because, theoretically, a perfected apparatus of socialization built along the lines sketched above, ought to at least be able to find out whether man is nothing more than a socialized being; rather, the question at this stage, is how to approach culture change, the making of the new man.

Within that context, two approaches are generally recommended:

1) a total break with the past of traditions and customs, and the conscious adoption (or imposition) of a new system of thought, value and norms, and 2) a gradual change in the culture, using reinterpreted history and myths, to justify the new system and socio-cultural, emotional trends to institutionalize the new.

The total change avenue has been argued by many authors, but perhaps, none as forcefully as Margaret Mead in her book New Lives For Old,<sup>24</sup> where she describes the change (as opposed to transition) of

<sup>24</sup> (1956; rpt. New York: William Morrow, 1966).





a totally primitive society into a startlingly modern one. And from that case, as well as her other experiences, Mead argues that wholesale culture change is better than gradual change because it is quicker and cleaner; it also avoids the long period in which dysfunctional strains are present, which usually accompanies gradual change. Yet, as Mead herself points out, her case-study is a unique experiment for many reasons; some of the most important of these are 1) the small population, 2) the fervent desire of the majority of people to change, and, 3) the historical coincidence of perfect leadership in the situational context. Thus, the experiment may well be, for all purposes, unique.

The second approach suggested was that of gradual change, using tradition. In that sense, many writers <sup>25</sup> have argued that modernizing ideologies must be congruent with political cultures because, as Apter puts it, "innovation . . . has to be mediated within the social system and linked with antecedent values." <sup>26</sup> This concept of modernization makes sense, because, in the case of the Buganda for example, Apter notes that "the prerequisite for accepting any innovation on the political level was to find some real or mythical counterpart." <sup>27</sup> In other words, manipulation, translation, adjustment, of the traditional political culture's goals and attitudes into the new ideology, in new conceptual schemes, is a much more powerful and

<sup>25</sup> See the discussion in Walter Connor, "Dissent in a Complex Society: The Soviet Case", Problems of Communism, 22, No. 2 (March-April 1973), pp. 40-52.

<sup>26</sup> Apter, The Politics..., p. 83.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 113.



successful method of change than the superimposition of a radically alien pattern. Ideologies must be able to reach the emotional as well as the intellectual man in order to make him respond fully; modernization in terms of traditions and historical trends of thought and behavior, personality and character, makes an appeal to both sides of man. The relationship that is suggested here is by no means a closed circle in which the two mutually affective concepts, ideology and political culture, turn; rather, in an evolutionary sense, it is more like a pattern of propagating waves that create, push, and destroy each other only to be born anew in a slightly different form, with a slightly different content, and continue the process, in a mutually influencing, dynamic, fashion. The process will be illustrated in chapter IV, which consists of a partial examination of the attempt at building the new Cuban man.



## CHAPTER III

### THREE PARTICULAR IDEOLOGIES

This chapter attempts to illustrate some of the observations made in the context of chapter one, with particular reference to the differentiations made between content and function ideology, the ideological functions of legitimization and self-identification, and the action-lever concept of ideology derived from the historical progression. In that context, it will examine 1) Négritude, as an example of content-ideology prompted by a French-African native elite's identity crisis; 2) Ujamaa as both a content-ideology--insofar as it, theoretically, legitimizes the Tanzanian regime in terms of traditional society--and a function-ideology--insofar as, pragmatically and politically it uses the ideology of rapid development; and 3) Cuban Castroism as primarily an example of function-ideology--action, change, and mobilization oriented.

It is difficult, in the space allotted to it by its ratio of importance in this discussion, to do justice to the concept of Négritude. One aspect of the movement that cannot be fully discussed here is the French colonial "situation" that breeds the identity crisis within which this "ideology" was born. Briefly, the process is started by the superimposition of the foreign, alien culture or civilization of the mother country, upon the culture of childhood; in that context, a mutually-dependent, crippling psychological relationship is created between the Colonized and the Colonizer, by the inequality present in the "situation". Albert Memmi has described





this process and its results in his book, Portrait du Colonisé (Paris: J. J Pauvert, 1966). Primarily an attempt at self-explanation and self-identification, the book is an analysis of the "colonial situation" far superior to those of Frantz Fanon<sup>1</sup> or O. Mannoni.<sup>2</sup> The emotionally-black, culturally-white colonized beings whose identity crisis Memmi has depicted so well usually form the intellectual and political elites of the colonies; yet these men are "caught" because they are alienated from their people by their "assimilated" culture, while identifying with the masses by reason of a) emotional heritage and b) reaction against the foreign civilization. In this context, political action against the colonial system is their only alternative, by virtue of the very process that has taught them that every man and all countries have a right to "liberté, fraternité, égalité". The dialectic of the crisis process might be seen as follows: 1) thesis--assessing and stating the situation, 2) antithesis--the negative identity stage, and 3) synthesis--the creation of the new self, the positive identity.

The other dimension of Négritude that cannot be fully discussed here is the psychological process of identity quest, crisis and formation; the general assumption in this context is that identity is a psychological necessity for a functioning, integrated, social being. The question of identity quest, crisis, and formation is largely the

<sup>1</sup> Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1967) and Towards The African Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).

<sup>2</sup> O. Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban (New York: Praeger, 1964).



work of Erik Erikson, whose general scheme is adopted for the discussion below.<sup>3</sup>

The sources of Négritude--the preoccupation with the Negro character and culture--may be traced to Du Bois' appeals for a return to Africa; they may also be attributed, in part, to Haitian research on folklore and "return-to-the-roots" attitude, published during the 1930's. It is in the Paris of those years, a Paris caught in the vogue of surrealism and the subsequent fad of exoticism, of interest in things African, that Aimé Césaire, Léopold Sedar Senghor, Léon Damas--the fathers of Négritude--found themselves, along with many less illustrious Negro students from France's colonies; full of enthusiasm, full of hope, they felt that they had finally arrived in the Promised Land. Looking back upon that period, Memmi writes about The Encounter with France bitterly: "ferais-je jamais mes comptes définitifs avec ce pays? Ce qu'il a représenté de loin, l'énorme déception qu'il fut de près, déception à en mourir, littéralement, puisque s'effondrait en même temps toute cette partie de moi-même que je croyais accordé à lui, soutenue par lui."<sup>4</sup> But for the moment, the young men are still full of youthful illusions, until the moment when a slight malaise sets in, a malaise that becomes alienation when they realize that if they are accepted in the French

<sup>3</sup> Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 1950), Identity, Youth and Crisis (New York: Norton, 1968) and Young Man Luther (New York: Norton, 1968).

<sup>4</sup> Albert Memmi, Le Scorpion (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), p. 85. "Would I ever finally settle my accounts with that country? What it had represented from afar, the enormous deception that it turned out to be at close quarters--literally, an almost fatal deception, for within me crumbled that whole part of myself that I had thought devoted to, and sustained by, it."





society, it is only superficially, because they are a curiosity, an oddity. Senghor writes:

Mettez-vous dans leur peau, réveillez-vous, un matin, noirs et colonisés, noirs et nus, dans le 'saisissement d'être vus' par le regard corrosif du Blanc. . . . Ils n'avaient pas de patrimoine: ils n'avaient rien pensé, rien bâti, rien peint, rien chanté. Ils étaient néant, au fond de l'abîme, dans l'absolu du désespoir.<sup>5</sup>

Thus the young men begin to feel exiled, exiled from their cultures and their countries, but also exiled from the self that they cease to understand, to which they now feel alien. And while they feel estranged from their own heritage and tradition, while they identify with the French civilization, it is the very process of learning the latter in depth that eventually provokes the crisis; Senghor notes that it is "vous-mêmes, Mesdames, Messieurs les Professeurs de Sorbonne, qui m'avez demandé . . . de ne plus décliner 'rosa la rose' et d'oublier mes 'Ancêtres les Gaulois',"<sup>6</sup> while urging him to go back and "enlighten" his people.

Coupled with the intellectual alienation, there is also, in the writers' perception, the feeling of an impossibility of emotive communication, between the calm, rational, staid, French culture and the emotional, rhythmic, moving African culture, Senghor has best expressed this feeling in his poem "Jardin de France":

<sup>5</sup> Léopold S. Senghor, Liberté 1 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1964), p. 133. "Put yourselves in their shoes and wake up one morning, blacks and colonized, in the 'shock of being seen' by the corrosive eye of the White. . . . They had no heritage: they had not thought anything, built anything, painted anything, sung anything. They were nothing, they were at the bottom of the abyss, and absolutely desperate."

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 316. "yourselves, Ladies and Gentlemen Professors of the Sorbonne who have asked me . . . not to decline 'rosa the rose' anymore, and to forget my Ancestors the Gauls."



Calme jardin,  
 Grave jardin, . . .  
 Mains blanches,  
 Gestes délicats, . . .  
 Mais l'appel du tam-tam  
     bondissant  
         par monts  
             et  
                 continents,  
 Qui l'apaisera, mon coeur,  
 A l'appel du tam-tam  
     bondissant,  
         véhément,  
             lancinant? <sup>7</sup>

In its early stages, the crisis is simply a feeling of despair at being torn, at being unable to reconcile the two halves of the self. But one day, like Césaire, the Negro who wears a white mask will encounter another Negro, a simple man of his color:

C'était un nègre grand comme un pongo qui essayait de se faire tout petit sur un banc de tramway. Il essayait d'abandonner sur ce banc crasseux de tramway ses jambes gigantesques et ses mains tremblantes de boxeur affamé. . . . C'était un nègre dégringadé sans rythme ni mesure. . . . Et l'ensemble faisait parfaitement un nègre hideux, un nègre grognon, un nègre mélancolique . . . un nègre comique et laid et des femmes derrière moi ricanaient en le regardant . . . J'arborai un grand sourire complice . . . Ma lâcheté retrouvée! <sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Armand Guibert, Léopold Sedar Senghor (Paris: Seghers, 1961), p. 114. "Calm garden,/ Grave garden, .../ White hands,/ Delicate gestures,/ . . . / But the call of the tam-tam/ bounding/ over mountains/ and/ continents,/ Who will soothe it, my heart,/ To the call of the tam-tam,/ throbbing,/ vehement,/ resounding?"

<sup>8</sup> Aimé Césaire, Cahier d'un Retour au Pays Natal (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1956), pp. 63-65. "It was a Negro tall like a stick, who tried to make himself all small on the bench of the tramway. He was trying to abandon his gigantic legs and his starving boxer's trembling hands on this filthy bench. . . . It was a Negro come down, without rhythm or bounds. . . . And the over-all effect made a perfectly hideous Negro, a peevish Negro, a melancholy Negro, . . . a comic, ugly, Negro, and the women behind me were snickering at him . . . I put on an accomplice's smile . . . My cowardice rediscovered!"



The encounter not only bursts upon the bubble of self-deceit but also indicates the identification object, the Negro. Thus starts the process that Sartre, much like Camus and Gide, has described as an Orpheus-like descent into hell, the hell of one's own inner self. For the authors of Négritude, the process commences with a more or less superficial identification with the color of their race. Thus all poems, prose, etc., will use darkness as a positive image, in keeping with the attempt to destroy certain myths about Blackness. Senghor, for instance says "Je proclame la Nuit plus véridique que/ le jour,"<sup>9</sup> while Césaire, in the context of his encounter with the ugly, comic Negro, writes that by "une inattendue et bienfaisante révolution intérieure, j'honore maintenant mes laideurs répoussantes."<sup>10</sup>

"Femme Noire", one of Senghor's best known poems, has been often interpreted as a racial poem, as a simple chant to the beauty and the superiority of the Negro woman. Taken at a deeper level, this poem indicates clearly the next step in the Negro intellectual's quest for an identity, for it expresses loudly the return towards the past, the acceptance of Africa, which is now the Promised Land--an Africa of legend and myth, a beautiful, maternal, woman, exuding a comforting warmth that Europe does not have and cannot give.

It has been often noted by critics that this particular

<sup>9</sup> Léopold S. Senghor, Ethiopiques (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1956), p. 55. "I proclaim the Night more truly real/ than the day."

<sup>10</sup> Césaire, Cahier..., p. 60. "by an unexpected and benevolent interior revolution, I now honor my repelling ugliness."





identification with a whole continent, with powerful traditions (mythical if nothing else) has given Senghor a stability that Césaire, a man who comes from France's long-forgotten Carribean islands, could not hope for. Perhaps this is the reason for which the latter's Cahier d'un Retour au Pays Natal, which portrays the poet's crisis of acceptance and identification, is a much more emotional, penetrating, painful and triumphant piece of work than any that Senghor has written.

Césaire's poem starts with a portrait of his lot, as seen by either a white man or an indifferent observer; thus he describes in somber, crude colors, the hunger, the alcoholism, the forgotten city covered in the dust of ignorance, the solitude of the people indifferent to their lot in the world, silent and alienated. And it is this, the misery, the long history of degradation, the fight for mere animal survival that he must accept and cannot, for the moment:

C'est toi, sale bout  
de monde. Sale bout de petit matin.  
C'est toi sale haine. C'est toi poids  
de l'insulte et cent ans de ma  
patience, cent ans de mes soins  
juste à ne pas mourir. <sup>11</sup>

Yet although he revolts, he must come to terms with the nauseating, hateful reality of his island and of the people he claims as brothers; in that setting, he must also come to terms with himself, for he has accepted his dark color and, little by little, begins to recognize himself in his people and its history. And as he cries

<sup>11</sup> Césaire, Cahier..., p. 53. "It's you, dirty corner/ of the world. Dirty corner of dawn./ It's you dirty hate. It's you weight/ of the insult and a hundred years of my/ patience, a hundred years of my care/ just not to die."



"j'accepte . . . j'accepte . . . entièrement, sans réserve . . .

ma race," <sup>12</sup> the divided being is whole again, and,

voici soudain que force et vie m'assaillent  
comme un taureau et l'onde de vie circonvient la  
papille du morne . . .

Et nous sommes debout maintenant, mon pays et  
moi, les cheveux dans le vent, ma main petite  
maintenant dans son poing énorme. <sup>13</sup>

Césaire, now, can stand alongside Senghor and say with him: "Me  
voilà rendu à la terre. Qu'il est radieux le Royaume d'enfance!" <sup>14</sup>

A negative identity, even if only a conscious reaction against  
the oppressor and a total acceptance of formerly rejected values,  
as opposed to a positive reunion of the two selves is, nevertheless,  
an identity; thus acceptance solves the immediate identity crisis.  
In the work of the authors of Négritude, this period produces  
writing that celebrates the difference between the Negro and the  
White man, and often implies the superiority of emotion over  
intellect. Senghor himself will stress this difference between the  
European civilization, characterised by observation, analysis, the  
need to find a *raison d'être* for all things--in essence, the  
analytic intellect--and the African civilization, which is feeling,  
emotion, meaning, action, total communication with the environment.

<sup>12</sup> Césaire, Cahier . . ., p. 77. "I accept . . . I accept . . .  
entirely, without reserve . . . my race."

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 82-83. "here it is that suddenly vigor and life  
charge me/ like a bull and the wave of life circumvents the/  
papilla of the hill . . . / And we stand now, my country and/ I, "  
hair blowing in the wind, my small hand/ now in its enormous fist.

<sup>14</sup> Senghor, Ethiopiques, p. 32. "Here I am given back to the  
earth. How radiant is the Kingdom of childhood!"





And thus Césaire sings the Negro's own merits:

Eïa pour ceux qui n'ont jamais rien inventé  
pour ceux qui n'ont jamais rien exploré  
pour ceux qui n'ont jamais rien dompté  
mais ils s'abandonnent, saisis, à l'essence de toute  
chose  
ignorants des surfaces mais saisis par le  
mouvement de toute chose  
insoucieux de dompter, mais jouant le jeu du  
monde  
véritablement les fils aînés du monde. <sup>15</sup>

It is in this period of negative identity that the concept of Négritude was defined by Senghor as "l'ensemble des valeurs culturelles du monde noir;" <sup>16</sup> culture, in this context, was defined as "une réaction raciale de l'Homme sur son milieu, tendant à un équilibre intellectuel et moral entre l'Homme et ce milieu." <sup>17</sup> In a sense, it is ironic to speak of this stage as "negative", since it was essential to the regaining of dignity and human status for a people that had felt forgotten, placed outside history, dehumanized. Senghor himself did not feel his position negative in any way; he stated that "'se revendiquer comme noir', c'est moins cette négation hautaine que l'affirmation de soi dans l'authenticité. Il est question d'un 'retour au pays natal' de 'l'Enfant prodigue', d'une

<sup>15</sup> Césaire, Cahier..., pp. 71-72. "Eia for those who have never invented anything/ for those who have never explored anything/ for those who have never tamed anything,/ but who abandon themselves, thrilled, to the essence/ of all things,/ ignoring the superficial, but thrilled with the/ movement of all things,/ not caring to tame, but playing the game of/ the world/ truly the oldest sons of the earth."

<sup>16</sup> Senghor, Liberté I, p. 9. "the totality of cultural values of the Black world."

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 12. "a racial reaction of Man upon his environment, tending towards a moral and intellectual equilibrium between Man and this environment."



descente aux abîmes de l'âme noire ou, pour employer le mot de passe, de la Négritude."<sup>18</sup> The emphasis, at this point, falls on the word "authentic"; it parallels Pye's observation on the need to provide the masses with "respectable and widely accepted explanations of their current backwardness and convincing reassurances that progress and dignity are possible for them."<sup>19</sup> Négritude may be seen, theoretically, as an attempt at 1) awakening the Negro abruti to an awareness of his own human rights as well as 2) building him into a new, independent and equal man; and while one cannot deny the pure humanity reflected in this attempt, it would also not be unfair to attribute a good deal of it to the personal pain incurred by the elite at the White man's refusal of acceptance. Césaire speaks of this in terms of a rebirth,<sup>20</sup> while Senghor sees it in terms of changing the intellectual and moral relationships between men, which is, by and large, the mission of the artist. The concept of the societal duty of the artist and creative intellectual, in this particular case, guides the poets towards the last stage of the dialectic, "engagement" or action; the "engagement" ought to lead them to the next psychological stage, the generativity period--which

<sup>18</sup> Senghor, Liberté 1, p.135. "'to claim oneself as black' is less a haughty negation, and more the affirmation of the self in authenticity. It is a question of the Prodigal Son's return to his native country, of a descent into the abyss of the black heart or--to use the password--into Négritude."

<sup>19</sup> Lucian Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation Building (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1962), p. 8.

<sup>20</sup> Aimé Césaire, Et Les Chiens Se Taisent (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1965), pp. 61-62.



Erikson defines as "primarily the concern for establishing and guiding the next generation."<sup>21</sup> In most cases, the authors of Négritude saw the action-phase as a political one and, consequently, became political leaders of various ranks. Césaire and Senghor, the best-known, both started their political activity around 1945. They are both leaders of the independent political parties they formed, respectively the Parti Politique Martiniquais and the Socialist Party of Senegal; they both occupy high political positions, Senghor serving as the President of Senegal and Césaire as deputy in the French Assembly, at the same time that he is mayor of Fort-de-France. Yet neither has made it to the top because of their "ideology"; in fact, Négritude seems to be separated from their politics and political attitudes. This is due to both the actual political reality in which they operate and to the fact that, by and large, Négritude has remained at the negative identity stage, never progressing to the synthesis which ought to correspond with the positive identity; this is clearly seen in these men's attempt at synthesis.

Senghor has advocated the concept of the métis culturel primarily because he, himself, has never been able to give up or obliterate the double French self that lives within him. Thus while the "assimilated" Frenchman sings admiring, loving odes to France, the African Negro seeks support in the Africa of legend and magic that he has known in childhood. Senghor is the prototype of the assimilated intellectual, aware of the ambiguity of his position, but unable to do

<sup>21</sup> Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis, p. 138.





anything about it. This is why he said in 1963 that Négritude "pour s'exprimer, doit se dépasser, en dépassant le folklore et l'exotisme;"<sup>22</sup> this is why he advocates Humanism, the unity of all races and the end of all oppressive situations in the world.

Césaire's synthesis is slightly different, possibly because he is much more action-oriented than the pensive, quiet Senghor; he is also in a different position, for while Senegal is independent and thus free to determine the extent of its relations with France, Martinique is still a department of France, with a growing independence movement among the younger generation. Césaire's synthesis is also humanitarian and devoid of racial differences and definitions, but slightly more Left-militant; although as much a métis culturel as Senghor, Césaire shows it less, and forbids his divided self to interfere with his actions.

The personal synthesis, it has been noted, should have coincided with the finding of the positive identity, so that the man may go unhampered into Erikson's generativity stage. But Césaire's and especially Senghor's syntheses do nothing more than allow these men to live with their private, divided selves, as personally torn beings. Their public, political beings which, for better or worse, owe their identity to the people, must follow the younger generation's line, because the men themselves cannot provide that "integrative image that could belong to everybody"<sup>23</sup> and which would generate a usable ideology. Yet if they follow the young, it is by having to

<sup>22</sup> Senghor, Liberté I, p. 430. "in order to express itself, must go beyond the stage of folklore and exoticism."

<sup>23</sup> Erikson, Childhood and Society, p. 310.



forget Négritude, for the former is, first and foremost, nationalistic and pragmatic, rather than universalistic and humanistic. Edouard Glissant <sup>24</sup> in Martinique and Jacques Rabemananjara <sup>25</sup> in Madagascar both regard the economic and social development of their respective nations as the first priority; both sing praise to their land rather than a distant France or Africa; both are concerned with building a national history, national myths, a proud past that will support the rude journey into the future. These younger men are humanists, and they do not reject the essentially fraternal, socialistic message of Négritude; but--while it is true enough that Négritude was not particularly created for these purposes--they find it unsuitable for the actual problems that concern them, nation-building and rapid economic development. Thus Négritude remains a content-ideology, with a humanistic message, the personal creation of a few men, that is relegated to the status of ideals.

Much the same situation has occurred in Tanzania, where Ujamaa (sometimes called "African Socialism:") is the official state ideology, created and propounded by one man, President Julius K. Nyerere. Ujamaa, however, was not created in the context of a personal identity crisis; it is rather an example of a content-ideology that attempts to legitimize the new system in terms of traditional African society as

<sup>24</sup> La Lézarde (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1958) and Le Quatrième Siècle (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1964).

<sup>25</sup> Antsa (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1961) and Agapes des Dieux (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1962).





well as to mobilize the population for development work in the same terms. Julius Nyerere's book, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968) is a collection of documents and essays so arranged as to explain the ideology simply and coherently; (in fact, it has been said that all Tanzanian officials were strongly urged to read the book). It is from these various essays by Nyerere that much of the following is drawn.

Nyerere's traditional society, upon which Ujamaa is based was structured along the lines of blood-relationship tribes, in which the central authority rested in the hands of a chieftain (although Nyerere tells us that his own tribe did not have such a chief). The emphasis was placed upon discussion among the Elders and the men of the tribe, discussions that did not cease until agreement on the issue had been reached. The society, and the tribe itself, was a community of individuals, each of whom had rights and obligations to the society. The community provided for the individual; at the same time, it offered him a definite and secure place in the world. In exchange, his obligation was to work for the community, for the common good--for the prosperity or poverty of the tribe reflected ultimately on the individual. Helping one's neighbour and hospitality were not obligations, but a way of life, in keeping with the general feeling of Brotherhood and Community. The society was completely classless--the Chief, for instance, was not considered to be wealthy, as an individual, for he was perceived to be holding the wealth of the tribe's members in trust. In the society, mutual obligation, sharing, cooperation and equality reigned; interdependence and a deeply spiritual tradition helped the feeling of unity within the tribe. Thus the society was not



only a social structure, but also very much a way of life.

Within that context, Ujamaa is primarily a (socialistic) attitude, or frame of mind, closely related to the way of life characteristic of Nyererian traditional tribal society. It is a set of humanistic principles, set in the broader frame of African Socialism. It stresses human dignity, equality, freedom, participation and consensus, the involvement of the masses. It expounds democratic principles of the rights of the individual as well as his obligations in a classless society. It allows private property to co-exist with communal, shared wealth, but it condemns the acquisition of wealth as both a non-social act and a vote of non-confidence <sup>26</sup> in the community that in the past took care of the individual. This socialism, for Nyerere and other African leaders, did not grow out of the traditional class struggle, but rather out of the tribal communal society. And while both the socialist emphasis and the traditional justification may possibly be seen as a reaction against colonial rule, Nyerere's own emphasis is on the link with the native rather than the colonial past; for if no one actually remembers that distant history, Nyerere can build a proud Tanzanian Golden Age which resembles the present system, and urge a return to it. In this respect, his attitude is very different from, for instance, Senghor's ambiguous feelings about France; the difference may well lie in the respective colonial regimes under which these two leaders were born--the French, that willfully attempted to assimilate the colonized

<sup>26</sup> Henry Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1967), p. 214.



populations within its culture, as opposed to the British, that largely contented itself with ruling over them.

Ujamaa contains, along with the legitimization of the new socialist regime in terms of traditional society, a built-in defense of the one-party system--of which Tanzania is an example; the latter is also skillfully wrought out of traditions by Nyerere.<sup>27</sup> The two-party system, says Nyerere, considered in Western society as the essence of democratic government, is a characteristic of class-society and thus finds no place to stand in the traditional classless African society. The Western model requires formal opposition, whereas, contends Nyerere, because of the tradition of discussion in tribal society, internal democracy is much more effective in an African party; this, theoretically, occurs in the spontaneous opposition that arises in the free discussion held at every Executive level of TANU (Tanzania's party). Thus the democracy of the African party comes from within, rather than by virtue of an external structure. As well, the fact that each of these Executive levels is responsible to its respective Annual Conference, which holds ultimate power, assures a maximum of consensus; at the same time, the grass-root structure allows for a two-way process, to and from the people. According to Ujamaa, the two-party system leads to representation of one group against another, on matters that are not fundamental, while the one-party system represents the whole, by its identification with the National Movement. In this context, its mass-party nature, which

<sup>27</sup> See Julius Nyerere, "One Party Rule", in The Ideologies of the Developing Nations, ed. Paul E. Sigmund, Jr. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963).





allows anybody to join, enables the individual best suited for the job to be chosen in the political elections. Thus there is an emphasis on individual value within the context of the greater, community oriented National Movement, an emphasis traditional in tribal societies.

As far as its content is concerned, Ujamaa provides a justification for the new regime, by presenting it as a natural extension of the traditional African society, be it mythical or real. Yet as far as its functionality is concerned, the problems encountered along the way have reduced its effectiveness to a great extent. For one thing, most of the other major leaders of Tanzania seem to be leaning more towards a variant of scientific socialism <sup>28</sup>--that is, an ideology of more rapid development than Ujamaa, with its demand for fraternal consciousness, etc., can hope to achieve. Secondly, at the middle-manager level, the levels of both acceptance and understanding of Ujamaa, vary greatly. Where understanding is the problem, the result is that mere slogans and directives are passed on to the next lower level; <sup>29</sup> while where the non-acceptance situation is concerned, the result is that the managers make pragmatic decisions of their own, in light of their perceptions of what rapid development signifies. Certainly, none of these men would disagree openly with Nyerere or his ideology--not because they are afraid to, but because for them, as for the masses, Nyerere occupies a very special historical position, <sup>30</sup> insofar as he brought about independence and thereby gained respect,

<sup>28</sup> Bienen, pp. 221-224.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 254.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 211.



admiration, and authority; rather, the President's theoretical arguments are by-passed silently in the process of daily decision-making.<sup>31</sup>

Thirdly, in the context of the larger mass of the population, communication problems related to illiteracy, patterns of settlement, and lack of mass media resources, impede the spread of the ideology by the mass media; thus the primary channel of communication used is the decentralized party organization. The problem of misunderstanding Ujamaa is common even at the cell-level; thus the problem of explaining the ideology to the wider public is amplified. The only Ujamaa-originated concept that peasants may have heard about is that of the self-help schemes; yet if the concept of participation for the sake of the community--whose wealth will then reflect on the individual--is not explained, then participation in these and other community-work oriented projects is not meaningful and eventually affective behavior, but a mere burden.

Ujamaa, like Négritude, operates at the level of ideals--but for different reasons. Because very little of it has been translated into meaningful and useful pragmatic schemes, it has been slow in creating the national mobilization required by Tanzania's underdeveloped economy. The lack of immediate results has brought about a feeling of impatience with this "ideology", which has resulted in non-acceptance by some, and poor understanding by others. Ultimately, it is material, economic development, that seems to be the elite's concern and the masses' wish; Nyerere's long-term plan for a classless, fraternal,

<sup>31</sup> Bienen, p. 254.





society, along the lines of the traditional community of individuals seems to them, at best, idealistic.

Since this discussion is concerned with the national rather than international aspects of particular ideologies, an elaboration on brands of African Socialism and their usage in Africa was deemed as unnecessary as an exposé of the Cuban theory of international revolution and guerilla-war prescriptions. It would be misleading, however, to omit an observation with respect to this point, insofar as international ideological tenets are usually related to the domestic scene. Thus, in Cuba for instance, such themes as the necessity for a world-wide fight against imperialism and the impossibility of building communism in one country are, to a certain extent, used to justify certain conditions (usually scarcities) found in Cuba today.

The Cuban ideology is markedly different from either Négritude or Ujamaa. For one thing, the country has had an actual revolution, whose martyrs, bloodshed, and victory have become some of the mainstays of the ideology; the theme of Tanzanian "independence" has not even attempted to achieve such a level of symbolic importance. Secondly, ideology as "the product of action and its object" is an especially fitting definition for Castroism, for the latter is action; it cannot be understood fully from a theoretical point of view such as studying Castro's speeches for ideological coherence. Castroism is, primarily, what Fidel Castro thinks, and what he convinces the people to do with him; even "what Fidel thinks" is slightly inaccurate, for the jefe, a pragmatist above all, seems to regard politics in the light of the particular situation that needs



explanation and definition. Herbert Matthews, for instance, has noted that "for Fidel Castro, at any given moment, everything really is 'absolutely clear'. It was so when he was making his worst mistakes." <sup>32</sup> This is not to say that Castro is unconcerned with the over-all coherence of his thought as it may appear to others--in fact, most of his speeches are attempts at justification and explanation of changes of thought or policy in terms of evolution of the revolutionary road whose turns may be unforeseen, or of the changing realities of the environment. Yet all in all, he has created an image of the Revolution as a moving, active, evolving force, which more or less "allows" him to change the course of the Cuban ideology as needs be. Along these lines, Castro said that the "Revolution moves forward; but it has scarcely begun. The work of the Revolution has scarcely begun." <sup>33</sup>

The still unfinished, evolving revolution is the main theme of Castroism that has remained unchanged through various reformulations and from which stem the other major themes; in its context, for instance, Castro uses the "Revolution" interchangeably with "government" or the Party, or himself, or the 26th of July Movement, in order to stress its all-encompassing presence. Related to this is the theme of the constant struggle (lucha) against apparently insurmountable odds and the consequent, successive "offensives"

<sup>32</sup> Herbert Matthews, Fidel Castro (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1969), p. 263.

<sup>33</sup> Fidel Castro, "We Will Never Build a Communist Conscience with a Dollar Sign...", in Fidel Castro Speaks, ed. Martin Kenner and James Petras (New York: Grove Press, 1969), p. 232.



against certain new (pragmatic) objectives. In this respect, Castro, like Nyerere, has created a (mythical) Cuban history of constant struggle--against colonialism, against imperialism, against tyranny and oppression--that stresses the continuous revolution and struggle. And while the actual revolution was carried out by a handful of men, the new phase mobilizes the whole population on behalf of the struggle, in an ever-present "revolutionary fervor". Dialectically linked with the concepts of action and struggle, and with the theme of the evolutionary Revolution, is the now-famous Castro dictum that "the Revolution is the only textbook used in Cuba." <sup>34</sup> In this context, it is not surprising to note that the ideological emphasis is on revolutionary activity, exemplary behavior, dedication, sacrifice, rather than on the learning of (whatever) body of ideas may stand behind the system.

In terms of bodies of ideas, although Castro has professed to be a Marxist-Leninist, he does not adhere strictly to the doctrine as it is known in most Communist countries. One main reason for this may be that, because of the concept of the changing revolution, a "set" body of ideas is impossible to hold; as Castro has said, "the ideas in our country have had to develop dialectically, in the struggle, in the conflicts." <sup>35</sup> Secondly, because of the same evolutionary, action-orientation, Castro has defined Marxism-Leninism in terms of

<sup>34</sup> Fidel Castro, "La Revolution ne s'apprend pas..." in Fidel Castro: Révolution Cubaine, 11, ed. L. Constant (Paris: Maspero, 1968), passim.

<sup>35</sup> Fidel Castro, "Whoever Stops to Wait for Ideas . . .", in Kenner and Petras, p. 177.





revolutionary thinking and action; he has said, along those lines:

"We hear formulas and read manuals, but nothing teaches better than a revolution . . . We are developing our ideas. We understand that Marxism-Leninist thought requires unceasing development." <sup>36</sup> The two primary "ideological" goals of Castroism, as seen by both Castro and Guevara, are the creation of the truly communist society, and of the new type of man who will inhabit that society. Castro has stated that "the great task of the Revolution is basically the task of forming the new man of whom we spoke here, the new man of whom Che spoke, the man of a truly revolutionary conscience, the man of a truly socialist conscience, the man of a truly communist conscience." <sup>37</sup> The communist essence, according to Castro, is unselfishness and a collective conscience, in keeping with the concept of the money-less society; the two concepts, society and man, are dialectically related, for while the new man is built to fit the new society, the new society cannot exist without him and his "developed consciousness ". In this context, Castro has affirmed his faith in the "original goodness" of human nature many times; and Guevara has commented along the same lines:

I believe that the simplest way to begin is to recognize his unmade quality: man as an unfinished product. The prejudices of the past are carried into the present in the individual's consciousness and a continual effort has to be made in order to eradicate them. On the one hand, society acts with its direct and indirect education; and on the other, the individual submits

<sup>36</sup> Fidel Castro, "Socialist Consciousness . . ." in Kenner and Petras, p. 208.

<sup>37</sup> Fidel Castro, "Creating Wealth with Political Awareness . . ." in Kenner and Petras, p. 318.



himself to a conscious process of self-education. . . . To construct communism simultaneously with the material base of our society, we must create a new man. This is why it is so important to choose correctly the instrument for the mobilization of the masses. The instrument must be of a fundamentally moral nature, without forgetting the correct utilization of material incentives, especially those of a social nature. As I have stated before, it is easy to activate moral incentives in times of extreme danger. To maintain their permanence, it is necessary to develop a consciousness in which values acquire new categories. Society as a whole must become a gigantic school.<sup>38</sup>

The issue of moral versus material incentives touches a tender spot in Cuban ideology, and it is not fully resolved yet. For insofar as economics are linked dialectically to moral development, money has been described by both Guevara<sup>39</sup> and Castro<sup>40</sup> as a buy-consume commodity which has made for human alienation and class-differentiation; it was meant to be replaced by the concept of work as a social duty performed willingly because of the raised consciousness of collective good.<sup>41</sup> And if work in the context of equality, consciousness, and learning is to change man's attitude towards his fellow men and towards the system, if it is to change the previous inequality existent in the relationship of man to man, then moral, rather than material incentives ought to be used. Along these lines, Castro said:

<sup>38</sup> Ernesto Guevara, "Socialism and Man in Cuba", in Che: Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara, ed. Rolando Bonachea and Nelson Valdés, (Cambridge: The M I T Press, 1969), pp. 158-159.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., pp. 162-163.

<sup>40</sup> Castro, "Creating Wealth with...", in Kenner and Petras, p. 326.

<sup>41</sup> Fidel Castro, "Communism Will Be..." in Kenner and Petras, p. 244.





And these things that the Revolution does, these ideas in relation to housing, medical services, education, in relation to everything that is given the people--without the need for payment, without the need for "dollar signs" in the head and bills in the pocket--tend to gradually create a more advanced social consciousness in the people, tend to create different property values in the people, a different regard for material possessions, a different regard for man's work. . . . many men and women, for a series of reasons--economic, social, or from lack of conscience--still cannot bring themselves to turn down the opportunity to receive something more for themselves. But those who wish to solve problems by appealing to personal selfishness, by appealing to individualistic effort, forgetful of society, are acting in a reactionary manner, . . . against the possibilities of creating a truly Socialist spirit, . . . against the effort to create an awareness in the people of the possibility of a way of life in which men, acting and working in unison, will be able to give each individual member of society much more than he could ever attain on a solitary path, left to his own resources. <sup>42</sup>

In this light, it is not surprising to note that Castroism's greatest emphasis is on the socialization of the new generation; its greatest effort is directed towards the children that are the greatest hope of success for the Cuban Revolution.

Yet while the above might be termed as the, more or less, constant content of Cuban ideology, the "definition" is incomplete without the particular, constant, all-embracing emphasis placed on action; both the content and the very manifestations of Castroism, for instance, stress the learning of proper attitudes through correct behavior. In that context, Castroism as an ideology might include such actual features of the Cuban system as Castro's unique brand of rule--the man and the leader in the context of his quasi-mystical

<sup>42</sup> Castro, "We Will Never Build a Communist Conscience. . . ." in Kenner and Petras, p. 226.



relationship with the masses, his use of traditional anti-U.S. feeling as a mobilizing factor, the pattern of government in terms of both the division of power and decision-making patterns, the structures and institutions of mobilization, socialization and learning, and the fantastic usage Castro makes of the mass media to widen the coverage given his lesson-speeches. Yet to discuss fully some of these aspects implies the question of changing the political culture in Cuba, the making of the new man, which is the task of the next, final chapter.



## CHAPTER IV

### CUBA: THE MAKING OF THE NEW MAN

In his book, Psychological Anthropology, Francis Hsu has said that

(t)he best accepted view at present is that the individual and society culture-relationship is a two-way traffic in spiral progression. The individual's psychological characteristics are results of his socialization processes, but his psychological characteristics are, in turn, at the root of the patterns of culture, in change or in stability, which govern the socialization process.<sup>1</sup>

In this context, it is the traditional patterns of Cuban culture that need to be sketched. They form the background against which the Cuban ideology and socialization are attempting to shape the new man.

It has been often noted that Cuba largely shared many of the characteristics of Latin American culture; some of these will be pointed out below. Yet for some observers of Cuban cultural history, the island does stand out among the other Latin American countries with respect to certain cultural traditions; one of these is its ethnic admixture and its effect upon the culture. Lowry Nelson has noted that unlike "most of the other Hispano-American cultures, that of Cuba is not a result of the mixture of Spanish and indigenous cultures, but rather that of two exotic cultures, the Spanish and the African, with only slight admixtures of French, Anglo-Saxon and

<sup>1</sup> Francis Hsu, "Editor's Introduction", Part III, Psychological Anthropology (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1961), p. 353.





Chinese." <sup>2</sup> And Ramón Ruiz, commenting upon the African influence, notes that the Negro has "given the Cubans a gentle, friendly, and optimistic attitude towards life. He has tended to emphasize the importance of the moment. He has filled the land with music, the drum and the dance." <sup>3</sup>

Many writers have noted what is generally termed the Cuban emphasis on the present; this cultural-psychological trait has been largely considered dysfunctional to the creation of a historical sense of nationhood. Edmund Desnoes, a contemporary Cuban novelist has described it thus:

I suspect civilization is just that: knowing how to relate things, not forgetting anything. That's why civilization is impossible here: Cubans easily forget the past: they live too much in the present. <sup>4</sup>

The environment is too poor, too soft, demands too little from the individual. Whatever talent Cubans might have is wasted as they try to adapt to the present, to this very instance. Wasted on appearances. People are not consistent, they're satisfied with so little. Drop projects when they're still half-finished, interrupt their own feelings, fail to follow things through to their final consequences. Cubans can't endure suffering for too long without laughing. The sun, the tropics, irresponsibility . . . <sup>5</sup>

The sun, the tropics, irresponsibility . . . generally, Latin Americans have usually been described as a sentimental people;

<sup>2</sup> Lowry Nelson, Rural Cuba (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1950), p. 140.

<sup>3</sup> Ramón E. Ruiz, Interpreting Latin American History (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), p. 406.

<sup>4</sup> Edmund Desnoes, Inconsolable Memories, tr. author (New York: New American Library, 1967), p. 37.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 53.



feeling, emotion, take precedence over the rational man.<sup>6</sup> They are held to have a consuming interest in ideas--as ideals<sup>7</sup>--and sentiments; emotion, living to the fullest in feeling, on a higher, idealistic level, is seen as a sort of self-fulfillment.<sup>8</sup> Javier, the Mexican hero of Carlos Fuentes' A Change of Skin, comments bitterly on this cultural trait:

I, like every Latin American intellectual who is worth his salt and his sinecure, know nothing at all except how to wax grandiloquent.<sup>9</sup>

Unconsciously we are all poets and we struggle to oppose nature with our patterns: nature which does not consider us individual beings at all but rather confluences of lives that cannot be isolated from one another, that flow together in a great whirl that neither begins nor ends.<sup>10</sup>

Between participation and escape there remain to us only our individual malaises, our personal cancers, our parodies of the great synthesis.<sup>11</sup>

This emotional, idealistic, nature cannot help but be romantic and, in the end fatalistic. The romanticism, the need for emotional stimulation, the easily aroused sentiments, partially explain the famous machismo which is, essentially, similar to the notion of "saving face". Another Fuentes hero comments on machismo in the

<sup>6</sup> John Gillin, "Ethos Components in Modern Latin American Culture", in Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America, ed. Dwight Heath and Richard Adams (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 513-514.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., pp. 515-516.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 511.

<sup>9</sup> Carlos Fuentes, A Change of Skin, tr. S. Hileman (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1968), p. 336.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 58.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.; p. 103.





following "definition":

Balls is all it takes to handle these people, they don't even notice it when you're raping them . . . If you try to be honest, they'll think you're a hypocrite. Beat them, steal from them, they don't mind as long as you have a good-looking broad with you and plenty of balls. They'll honor you most when you make perfect fools of them. <sup>12</sup>

Machismo, in turn, partially explains the cult of personalismo--the identification with the leader as a man, rather than with his political programme. And based on the latter cult is the recurrent myth of the caudillo, the romantic hero-liberator on horseback, which has partially bred and supported the tradition of charismatic leadership in most of Latin America.

In historical terms, independence, for Cuba, meant the exchange of a political master--Spain--for an economic one--the United States, which was Cuba's main buyer of sugar, and thus the mainstay of the island's economy. Suchlicki notes that the perpetuation of the dependence also postponed the need for the Cubans to take charge of their own affairs; the lack of responsibility, even if theoretically restricted to the economic sphere, was not conducive to responsible self-government. <sup>13</sup> It had also led the people "to expect too much from the capitol and too little from their own efforts." <sup>14</sup> Thus, as Nelson points out,

<sup>12</sup> Carlos Fuentes, Where the Air is Clear, tr. S. Hileman (New York: Ivan Obolensky, 1960), p. 80.

<sup>13</sup> Jaime Suchlicki, University Students and Revolution in Cuba (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1969), pp. 17-18.

<sup>14</sup> Nelson, Rural Cuba, p. 246.



the people will tolerate poor facilities indefinitely, contenting themselves with criticism of the central government and the sending of petitions or delegations to the Presidente, rather than spend their efforts at improving conditions by themselves. This lack of community cohesion at the local level derives, in part, from the centralized pattern of government, from the paternalistic tradition inherent in the feudal and slave societies, and from the fact that the family and the larger kinship groups remain extremely strong as units of Cuban society. <sup>15</sup>

The public indolence combined with the machismo and personalismo cults were reflected in the political system. Suchlicki tells us that

Cuba's social system also preserved the colonial Spanish attitude that public office was a source for personal profit. Electoral fraud became a standard practice. Politics became the means to social advancement, a contest between factions for the spoils of office. Personalismo was substituted for principle and allegiance to a man or a group the only way to insure survival in the political arena. <sup>16</sup>

In general, as Arthur Whitaker and David Jordan note, Cuba's "efforts at political stability have usually led to authoritarian regimes, and Cuban nationalism has never been constantly identified with democratic forms of government." <sup>17</sup> Thus the historical political tradition of Cuba alternated generally between instability and authoritarian--and also unstable--rule.

The absence of a Cuban democratic tradition has been largely

<sup>15</sup> Nelson, Rural Cuba, p. 247.

<sup>16</sup> Suchlicki, University Students..., p. 17; on the same point, see also James O'Connor, "Cuba: Its Political Economy" in Cuba in Revolution, ed. Rolando Bonachea and Nelson Valdés (New York: Anchor-Doubleday, 1972).

<sup>17</sup> Arthur Whitaker and David Jordan, "Nationalism and the Triumph of the Revolution" in Political Power in Latin America, ed. Richard Fagen and Wayne Cornelius, Jr. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 345.



attributed to the absence of a strong and coherent middle-class<sup>18</sup>--  
 aside, that is, from such problems as centralized government and  
 foreign domination. Lowry Nelson, among others, has noted the  
 absence of such a class.<sup>19</sup> Rather, what may have been called middle-  
 class in Cuba was a fragment of society that was sandwiched between  
 the upper and the lower class. Caught between upper-class  
 aspirations and a lower-class situation, in a context which defined  
 "class" in terms of the degree of manual labor performed,<sup>20</sup> this  
 group lacked coherence of opinion.<sup>21</sup> The fragmented nature, the lack  
 of class-consciousness,<sup>22</sup> are also noted by Desnoes; he writes:

I can't think of the Cuban bourgeoisie without foaming  
 at the mouth. I hate them with tenderness. Feel sorry  
 for them: for what they could have been and what they  
 wasted out of plain stupidity. For a time I tried to  
 convince them to go into politics, throw out all those  
 professional politicians and tin soldiers, find out what  
 is happening in the rest of the world. I insisted that  
 they had to modernize the country: put an end to all  
 those thatched huts and all that Cuban rhythm and  
 primitive gaiety and force everybody to study  
 mathematics. Nothing.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>18</sup> On the relationship between middle-class and democratic  
 institutions see, for instance, Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man  
 (New York: Anchor-Doubleday, 1963).

<sup>19</sup> Nelson, Rural Cuba, p. 139; on the topic of Latin American  
 middle-class definition, see J. J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin  
America (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1958), pp. viii-ix, 2-4, and  
 Ralph Beals, "Social Stratification in Latin America " in Heath and  
 Adams, pp. 347-350.

<sup>20</sup> Nelson, Rural Cuba, pp. 159-161, Beals, p. 347.

<sup>21</sup> Johnson, pp. 4-5.

<sup>22</sup> O'Connor, pp. 59-61.

<sup>23</sup> Desnoes, p. 30.





Nothing in their heads, no dignity, no backbone; the middle class here is like a meringue on the door of a school, as they say, yes, a meringue on the door of the revolution.<sup>24</sup>

Another very important ingredient in the Cuban political culture was the Cubans' reaction to the United States.<sup>25</sup> It is probable that the upper class which profited largely, and the "middle class" that profited somewhat, from Cuba's relationship with the United States did not "object" to the heavy North American investment;<sup>26</sup> yet a mood of resentment against the "new" masters did exist.<sup>27</sup> Those Cubans speaking in the 1960's through C. Wright Mills' Listen, Yankee (New York: Ballantine, 1960) probably only emphasize the general mood of the country in complaining of United States exploitation. Gambling millions of dollars that came from Cuban sugar estates, and supporting a corrupt Cuban government for the sake of their economic interests are only two examples of what Cubans saw as American "profiteering".

A long-standing history of student political activism was yet another important trait in Cuban political culture. Since the

<sup>24</sup> Desnoes, p. 39.

<sup>25</sup> See for instance, Hugh Thomas, Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1971), pp. 1062-1064; and Matthews, ch. six.

<sup>26</sup> On this, as well as the next point, see Ramón E. Ruiz, Cuba: The Making of a Revolution (Cambridge: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1968), pp. 7-9 and ch. two.

<sup>27</sup> Richard Fagen, "The Cuban Revolution: Enemies and Friends" in David Finlay et al., Enemies in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1967), pp. 217-223.



subject has been examined in depth in a number of books,<sup>28</sup> it may suffice to point out here the situation in the 1950's, as Suchlicki has described it:

Whereas students from earlier generations had been able to find national leaders embodying their aspirations and ideals, such as Grau and Chibás, these students were now unable to find a comparable charismatic leader. Some of the old leaders of the generation of 1930 seemed to have renounced their early idealism. Others were disillusioned and frustrated. Chibás was dead. National reformist leadership seemed to be either lacking or ineffective. Although the students still identified with some Ortodoxo leaders, they were now unwilling to place their faith too readily on members of the older generation. A generation break, stronger perhaps than any other one in Cuban history was taking place in the 1950's--a break that thrust upon the young the leadership of the anti-Batista movement.<sup>29</sup>

Aside from the question of "political generations",<sup>30</sup> Suchlicki and others<sup>31</sup> also note the particularly violent student "gangsterism" present at the time, and the public reaction to it--admiration for the boldness and daring, along with a strong wish to see order restored.

This, in very broad lines, is the political culture in which the Cuban Revolution was bred and from which it arose. This is also the background against which it was made and which supports it, the

<sup>28</sup> Aside from Suchlicki's account, a good report is to be found in Revolutionary Struggle, 1947-1958, ed. Rolando Bonachea and Nelson Valdés (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1972).

<sup>29</sup> Suchlicki, University Students..., p. 71.

<sup>30</sup> See Maurice Zeitlin's analysis in his "Political Generations", in Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, 1970).

<sup>31</sup> Among the others: Matthews, Fidel Castro, pp. 139-140, William Stokes "National and Local Violence in Cuban Politics" in Background to Revolution, ed. R. F. Smith (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), and Nathaniel Weyl, "The Student Assassins" in Red Star Over Cuba (New York: Devin-Adair, 1960).





"conditioning element of action" mentioned above.

It has been noted that, in order to best "socialize" and thus change the political culture, ideology must, to a certain extent, congrue with traditions within it. The Cuban ideology uses certain traditional trends to combat others, at the same time that it uses certain aspects of the culture to support and legitimize the regime and mobilize the population. In the context of mobilization systems, the process is achieved through both symbolic and institutional socialization. What follows is an overview of the way in which this applies to the Cuban context.

The colonial mentality <sup>32</sup> has been played upon by Castro as an impediment to the development of the new, equal man; <sup>33</sup> most of the blame is, of course, directed at the United States, <sup>34</sup> the representative par excellence of the imperialist world in Castroism. This has resulted in the Cuban ideology's playing up such themes as: the American exploitation of Cuba and other parts of the world, the former economic dependence of the island upon the States, the cruelty and injustice manifested by the Americans in cutting off the Cuban sugar quota, and the United States' role in both the Bay of Pigs invasion and in the Missile crisis. The incidents and the history are real enough; Castro, however, has linked them sequentially to create the image of an ever-ready "enemy" <sup>35</sup>--thereby attempting to

<sup>32</sup> See Ruiz, Cuba..., pp. 165-166.

<sup>33</sup> Castro, "Creating Wealth with...", in Kenner and Petras, *passim*.

<sup>34</sup> The theme is constantly stressed; for one instance see Castro's speech on August 10, 1967, in Fidel Castro, Major Speeches, (London: Stage 1, 1968).

<sup>35</sup> For an elaboration of the concept of "enemy" in politics, see Finlay et al.; Fagen discusses the Cuban case in ch. IV.



keep the population in a state of constant guard against the United States. Castro has also used the presence and the actions of the United States to 1) justify the general shortages of certain goods and, 2) historically to show the need for nationalism and patriotism. A situation where Cuba may be shown to have some (at least symbolic) power over the "colossus of the North", creates a certain amount of national pride among the masses. Along these lines, Castro has said: "What perhaps irks the imperialists and their stooges most is the fact that this small country of ours, situated on the very doorstep of the United States in the Caribbean which Yankees once considered their private preserve, was able to cancel out the past, to carry out the revolution, to defend itself and hold its own." <sup>36</sup>

The orientation toward the present which Desnoes decried so bitterly has been covered within the ideology; the themes of a past of struggle, <sup>37</sup> the present of sacrifice, and the future of the new society, add a perceptual dimension of historical depth. If, as the novelist said, Cubans used to forget the past, they are less likely to do so now, for past heroes such as José Martí and past wars and revolutions are themes constantly repeated in the Cuban daily experience. Likewise, if the environment used to demand too little, the situation today is one of constant ideological--moral and physical--demand upon the population. And if it is true that

<sup>36</sup> Fidel Castro Speech, July 26, 1972, New Times, #34, (August 1972), p. 13.

<sup>37</sup> Thomas, pp. 1491-1492.



irresponsibility existed in the old society, it is strongly frowned upon in the new system, where duty and responsibility to the community are emphasized and reinforced through a multitude of channels.

Yet at the same time that his ideology attempts to combat these traditions, Castro--perhaps unconsciously--uses the emotional heritage. For one thing, his very appeal is emotional. Thus although his speeches attempt to teach, rationally and logically, the development of the Revolution, both the arguments used and the nature of his relationship with the masses, are largely emotional. Whether Castro, like Fuentes' Javier, merely "waxes grandiloquent" is not important insofar as his appeal is concerned, for to a large extent Castro belongs to the category of charismatic leaders. Whether charisma be defined as a personal quality or as an emotion created in the context of his relationship with the masses, Castro was reported to have possessed it even before the Revolution.<sup>38</sup> The subsequent romantic myth of the "caudillistic" guerilla war only magnified the appeal and the masses' identification of the Revolution with Fidel and of themselves with the leader. In this context, perhaps unconsciously, Castro is using the tradition of personalismo, which makes it easier for him to change political face as long as he retains the personal admiration and love of the people. In terms of the larger tradition of machismo, Castro may well be telling the Cubans that it is time they became "men"; this may be observed in speeches that stress the degrading (emmasculating) past of foreign domination.

<sup>38</sup> Carlos Franqui, The Twelve (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1968), esp. pp. 71-76.





By consequence, this theme points to the need for the nation to take responsible charge of its own affairs. Castro's general definition of "man" as a revolutionary <sup>39</sup> fits in this general context.

While the centralized, personalistic government tradition is perpetuated in the new regime, Castro's emphasis on national unity is an attempt to create national cohesion and destroy certain (slight) provincial loyalty traditions. Allegiance to the fatherland rather than to the family is yet another dimension of nationhood which must be instituted; <sup>40</sup> in this context, the often-repeated allusions to the greatness of the 1959 Revolution, combined with the stress on the importance of national community development are two of the main themes taught. At the same time, the stress placed on the masses' role in the making of the Revolution, and on the responsibility and importance of each individual in the "march forward" are ideological tenets that attempt to destroy the previous fatalistic and deterministic attitudes towards participation in the political process. In the same context, Castro has attempted to alter the previous pattern of perception of the political life as a place for personal profit, which encouraged fraud, bribery, patronage, political factions and cliques. Lockwood notes that since

coming to power, Castro has given the country for the first time a government virtually free of corruption and abuse. He has eradicated graft, gambling, and prostitution and abolished the use of position for personal privilege, deep

<sup>39</sup> Fidel Castro, "Eulogy for Che Guevara" in Kenner and Petras, *passim*.

<sup>40</sup> The point is made by Jaime Suchlicki, "An Assessment of Castroism", *Orbis*, 16, No.1 (Spring 1972), 35-57; it is also supported by Nelson's analysis of the Cuban family in Rural Cuba, ch. ten.



festers which Cuban society formerly suffered with resignation. Fidel's insistence that his associates continue to wear their guerilla uniforms and live a comparatively Spartan existence is a tacit way of demonstrating that the leaders are at the service of the people, not the other way round, as under former governments. Moreover, every Cuban knows that, no matter how hard people are working, no one is working harder than Fidel.<sup>41</sup>

Aversion to manual work is yet another theme of traditional political culture in Cuba, as in most of Latin America. In Castro's society, both for pragmatic and moral reasons, this attitude is dysfunctional. Thus not only does Fidel expound on its basic selfishness, but he also tries to be one of the best examples of the "new" attitude; cutting cane during harvest time is one of the better known instances. Castro has also attempted to change this attitude by stressing the fact that intellectual work is not superior to manual work; in many instances, of which the "Ten Million" harvest would be an example, he has urged fonctionnaires to forego their paper-work for the time being, and labor in the fields. Along these lines, in an attempt to institutionalize a favorable attitude towards manual labor, most white-collar workers, school children of all ages, and university students are required to perform a certain number of hours of voluntary work in the countryside or in production.

The tradition of student activism has been taken into consideration by the new Cuban regime. For one thing, Castro's background as a student revolutionary gives the students an

<sup>41</sup> Lee Lockwood, Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 279.





identification symbol. Secondly, Castroism recommends that students be constantly involved--be it in actual concentrated learning, in voluntary work, or in political education. Thirdly, and perhaps most important, the students' part in the future of the Revolution, the Revolution's hope in them, is a theme constantly emphasized; this gives them both a symbolic role as well as a sense of responsibility in the regime--and thereby channels youthful energies into a commitment to the system.

The image of the "enemy" standing ready to destroy Cuba at any moment, the vision of the heroic past and of the glorious future and of the contemporaneous Revolution that demands constant "offensives", the emphasis on the (real or mythical) role of the masses and of every individual in the process of the revolution, the image of the honest and hardworking government, and, finally, of Castro the charismatic leader and teacher, are all ideological themes used symbolically to mobilize the Cuban masses. It seems to have worked; Lockwood, among many others, reported that even seven years after the Revolution there was in Cuba "much of the same spirit of excitement, of a sense of purpose, of a moral momentum, of a people making their own destiny, that charged the air when Castro's revolution swept into power."<sup>42</sup> And while some of these mobilization themes use tradition to either combat tradition or increase support for the regime, all point, at the same time, to the future--and in particular, to the Cuban way of getting there, the new behavior of the new man.

<sup>42</sup> Lockwood, p. 281.



The proper behavior is to be taught through both institutional and symbolic socialization; in this context, it must be remembered that the symbolic and the organizational processes interact to a great extent--when they are not actually one and the same. Castro, for instance, is both the guiding force of the socialization experiment and an agent himself. As an agent, he, in turn, uses a) the channel of his own charismatic relationship with the masses and b) a more traditional socializing agent such as the mass media in order to mobilize the population into affective participation--and, thereby, change its attitudes. Fagen has found Castro's words and presence one of the main strengths of the Cuban system, insofar as his rhetoric continues to appeal to the masses; Fagen's own impression is worth quoting at length:

For better or for worse, the Cuban Revolution bears the inedible imprint of one man--Fidel Castro. . . . With respect to mobilization and cultural transformation efforts in Cuba, Castro's most important characteristic is his charisma. . . . he still commands an impressive and devoted following. The call to associate oneself with Fidel and through him with the miracle of the Granma, the glories of the Sierra Maestra, the defeat of Batista, the victory at Playa Girón, and the transformation of the social order continues to stir the Cuban masses in a way not easily understood by those who have not lived through the events themselves. For many, the revolution remains incarnate in Fidel: he is the prophet who led his people out of the Batistiano wilderness, turned back the Yankee hordes, and is now constructing a promised land full of employment and social equality. He was a legend before he was 33, and has been the maximum leader ever since. Castro's presence--both physical and symbolic--has been a key element in all revolutionary programs undertaken in the new Cuba. <sup>43</sup>

Castro's presence is widely-felt not only in the constant stream of

<sup>43</sup>. Fagen, The Transformation..., pp. 26-27.



comments and reports in the daily press, television, and radio coverage of Cuban affairs, but also in person--for he was reputed to travel constantly all over the island. His personal style, his magnetic presence, his symbolic importance as the leader of the Revolution, combined with the famous didactic marathon speeches, make Castro a powerful socializing agent. At the same time, because he is the maximum leader and First Secretary of the Party, he may also be seen as an actual institution.

In the same symbolic socialization context, aside from leadership style, Edelman's list of the "symbolic uses of politics" includes the areas of rituals and symbolic action, as well as the settings in which the latter two occur; these symbolic devices are fully used in the Cuban system. Examples of such might be: the opening of a school at the former site of the Columbia fortress, celebrating en masse every anniversary, naming schools and institutions after heroes of the Revolution, making an institution-wide event out of an exemplary worker, planting a tree "for the Revolution", and the like, which are common occurrences in Cuba today.

In terms of actual, traditional, institutionalized socializing agents, the Cuban case is very interesting. For one thing, it must be remembered that the goal of the Revolution is change, and that for wholesale change, the Cuban leaders feel, "revolutionary fervor" is essential. Guevara, for instance, pointed out that "it is easy to activate moral incentives in times of extreme danger;" <sup>44</sup> the

<sup>44</sup> Guevara, "Socialism and Man..." in Bonachea and Valdés, Che..., p. 159.





difficulty, however, arises in maintaining the mobilization spirit in peaceful times. In this context, it is not surprising to note that the institutionalization of the Revolution has been postponed, and the image of the unfinished, contemporary, struggle, retained.

Guevara has written:

The institutionalization of the Revolution has still not been achieved. We are searching for something new which will allow perfect identification between the government and the community as a whole, adjusted to the peculiar conditions of the building of socialism . . . Our greatest restraint has been the fear that any formal aspect might separate us from the masses and the individual.<sup>45</sup>

The organizational flexibility allowed in this context has both ideological and pragmatic causes. Ideologically, the Cubans proclaim their right to find their own path to socialism. For practical purposes, organizational flexibility is necessary to a leader who swept into power without the backing of an institutional organ--such as the Communist Party. Castro himself is reported to have explained this need:

When one agitates from a barricade, when one issues a revolutionary proclamation, it all looks easy from afar. . . . Yet the most difficult task is the task of creating a new society. The most difficult task is to convert ideas into realities. Ideas have countless interpretations, a number of overtones. And stop to think what a revolution is at the outset. . . . It is a struggling, working beehive of men who, though filled with good intentions, lack experience, lack knowledge, lack training. And suddenly, there is thrust on the shoulders of these men the task of making the nation move forward, administering everything.<sup>46</sup>

In this flexible, change-oriented context, it is quite understandable

<sup>45</sup> Guevara, "Socialism and Man..." in Bonachea and Valdés, Che..., pp. 161-162.

<sup>46</sup> Matthews, p.133.



that the socialization agents will be those that best serve the leadership's goals. Thus some of the agents of socialization listed in chapter II (the family, the school, peer groups, university, work, and political parties) will be emphasized more than others. Before proceeding to an examination of the Cuban experience with respect to socialization agents, it needs to be pointed out here that they share a general characteristic of mobilization-systems agents, insofar as they perform the double duty of teachers and coercers. Yet, because coercion usually takes the form of social shaming,<sup>47</sup> rather than mere physical goading, it also teaches, by reinforcing the lesson of a moral duty to the society and fellow-men.

In Cuba, the family's role is deemphasized for two major reasons. For one, because of the ideological emphasis on the formation of the new man, no detail of it is left to chance; thus, because the family is deemed to be the main carrier of traditional political culture, its influence upon the children is minimized.<sup>48</sup> Secondly, ideological pressures urge women to work--both because of the labor shortage, and also because, if women work outside the home, the traditional male-female inequality<sup>49</sup> pattern might be broken. Children, then, must be sent to nurseries and kindergartens before they are of school age; these institutions also provide controlled,

<sup>47</sup> See Zeitlin's 1969 commentary, esp. pp. xvii-xxxx.

<sup>48</sup> See Lowry Nelson, Cuba: The Measure of a Revolution (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1972), pp. 151-152.

<sup>49</sup> See, among other Castro speeches, his May 1, 1966 speech in Fidel Castro, Major Speeches.





ideologically-manipulable settings for early attitude learning.<sup>50</sup>

The peer group is the only other traditional socializing agent that might have been subject to individual choice rather than social control. At any age group, however, most "peers" in Cuba are likely to be members of one or another socio-political mass organization;<sup>51</sup> thus the creation of possible settings where negative attitudes might be reinforced, is reduced. As well, the ideological emphasis on membership in mass organizations, and on the individual members' responsibility to the system tends to give the concept of "peer" a "societal-brother" rather than "personal-friend" connotation. Thus a dimension of social conscience<sup>52</sup> exists in the peer relationship context as well, and likely helps reinforce positive attitudes towards the system.

Education and learning have been mentioned as two main themes of the Cuban ideology; they are stressed in symbolic education, in Castro's speeches, as well as in the actual agents of socialization that schools, universities, technological institutes, etc., provide. Because, as mentioned above, youth is the future of the Revolution, no efforts are spared to provide facilities for learning. Schools

<sup>50</sup> See Elizabeth Sutherland, The Youngest Revolution (New York: Dial Press, 1969), p. 174.

<sup>51</sup> See Fagen, "Mass Mobilization in Cuba...", in Bonachea and Valdés, Cuba in Revolution, passim, as well as scattered comments on Cuban youth in Sandy Levinson and Carole Brightman, Venceremos Brigade (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971).

<sup>52</sup> This type of friendly, but critical if necessary attitude seemed to be shared by most of the workers Zeitlin interviewed for his book.



have been built, teachers sent out in the countryside, drives started to enroll as many children in school as possible;<sup>53</sup> and the government (Castro) loses no opportunity to remind the youth of the social responsibility that rests on their shoulders in view of the sacrifices the country has made and will continue to make, in order to keep them in school at the state's expense. The most striking feature of Cuban schools is not so much the political content of the education<sup>54</sup>--such as learning that Martí and Guevara were heroes<sup>55</sup>--as the attempt to combine learning with practical examples that have symbolic meaning; working in the fields, or on a special patch of land is such an example; as Sutherland points out,

the work itself was a way of learning to think along new, socialist lines. The student-worker would hopefully realize that food was not goods to be bought in a store with money, but the product of someone's calloused hands and aching back. Old ideas of class status and city-country status would thus be broken down. Old ideas about work would change, and this in turn would alter old attitudes of Man toward Man.<sup>56</sup>

The change of attitudes is also attempted through a stricter control of the learning environment. Nelson Valdés reports that a program is under way to place all students in boarding schools similar to the model he describes below:

<sup>53</sup> See, for instance, Richard Jolly, "Education" in Cuba: the Economic and Social Revolution, ed. D. Seers (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1964), passim; the theme is also constantly stressed in Castro's speeches.

<sup>54</sup> José Yglesias, In the Fist of the Revolution (New York: Pantheon, 1970), p. 261.

<sup>55</sup> Thomas, p. 1428.

<sup>56</sup> Sutherland, p. 111.



It is from this program that the New Man is to emerge. The boarding schools have a communal system of living and the students' lives are totally organized under the guidance of instructors. In this fashion a spirit of brotherhood, cooperation, egalitarianism, and solidarity is fostered and no opportunities are allowed for anyone to go astray or acquire bad habits. In these schools everyone is discouraged from egotistical views, private property is played down, and a new conception of labor is encouraged. Work becomes a pleasurable and ennobling activity, not a sacrifice or duty. <sup>57</sup>

It is not only in political education combined with practical applications in a controlled setting <sup>58</sup> that the school and university (state controlled now) socialize; the military is also involved, insofar as military training and instruction is now also part of the curriculum, and part of the educational structure is under the supervision of the military. <sup>59</sup> While noting this recent move of the Cuban government, Valdés comments that one "must wonder whether the Cubans are unable to draw the line between Spartan-like militarism and communism because of the apparent egalitarianism, discipline, and action orientation of the former." <sup>60</sup> Nelson omits to mention in this context that the armed forces are themselves a mobilization agent. Fagen points out at least two significant aspects of this:

a) the importance of the barbudos in the early years of the

<sup>57</sup> Nelson Valdés, "The Radical Transformation of Cuban Education" in Bonachea and Valdés, Cuba in Revolution, p. 452; Sutherland also mentions Boarding School No. 1, p. 30.

<sup>58</sup> On the effect of school as a controlled setting, see D. Koff and G. von der Muhl, "Political Socialization in Kenya and Tanzania", JMAS, 5, No. 1 (1967), 13-20 in particular.

<sup>59</sup> Valdés, "The Radical Transformation...", pp. 453-454.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 454.





revolution and, b) the creation of the national militia in 1959, through which a greater number of people were made to feel active participants in the revolution.<sup>61</sup>

Greater involvement in, as well as a better understanding of, the Revolution is the goal of the adult education system, which was begun in 1961 with the Campaign against Illiteracy. The latter is one of the primary culture-change agents discussed by Fagen in his book The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba. The experiment had many varied implications. For one, it gave the youth mobilized to make up for a shortage of trained teachers both a sense of participation in the Revolution and a feeling of having accomplished one of its goals.<sup>62</sup> The very experience, as well as the newly-acquired reading skill,<sup>63</sup> enabled some of the former illiterates to feel closer to the process of the Revolution and its proposed social changes. Yet insofar as the Campaign swept the whole country into its battle-fever, it was the symbolism of struggle and victory that was particularly noteworthy. Fagen writes that the

literacy campaign, if not an overwhelming and unquestionable triumph from the scholastic point of view, was nevertheless seminally important in the evolution of the institutional life and political culture of the revolution . . . The public

<sup>61</sup> Fagen, "Mass Mobilization in Cuba...", pp. 207-208.

<sup>62</sup> See, for instance, Juan Goytisolo's description of a 1962 parade of alfabetizadores, in Pueblo en Marcha (Buenos Aires: Libros de la Pupila, 1969), p. 83.

<sup>63</sup> For some statistical results of the campaign, see Nelson, Cuba, pp. 134-138, and Jolly's chapter IV in Seers.



rhetoric and the symbolism of the campaign were permeated with the imagery of national emergency, battle, and triumphal march.<sup>64</sup>

The similarities between the joyous return of the literacy army and the triumphal entry of the guerilla troops only three years earlier were not lost on the population. It was one of the revolution's finest hours.<sup>65</sup>

The other adult education feature that Fagen discusses is the Schools of Revolutionary Instruction, used primarily to teach Marxism-Leninism and the basics of Cuban Revolutionary ideology. Because they were under party control--that is, subject to its ideological changes of course--and because it became obvious that the changing course of the Cuban Revolution could not be easily taught in classroom situations, the schools were closed in 1968. Richard Jolly<sup>66</sup> mentions, aside from these Schools, a host of other adult education programmes such as: courses given by various ministries and institutions, minimal literacy and technical state evening courses, special boarding schools, special rural classes to continue the literacy program, etc.

The political content adult education teaches,<sup>67</sup> is reinforced by the participation of the majority of the Cuban population in the many mass organizations created by the Castro regime; these may be either "revolutionary" or "communist" occupational unions. They attempt, primarily, to encourage participation in their particular

<sup>64</sup> Fagen, The Transformation...., p. 55.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>66</sup> in Seers, pp. 207-219.

<sup>67</sup> See Richard Fagen, Cuba: The Political Content of Adult Education (Stanford: Stanford Univ., The Hoover Institution, 1964).





area, in keeping with the ideological tenet of "education through participation" mentioned earlier; they may also supervise coordination and communication within the body and exercise some control, both within and outside the scope of the organization concerned <sup>68</sup>--since no one part of the system is thought of as divorced from the whole. It is worth remembering here that, as was noted above, most of the control or coercion used in Cuba takes the form of peer groups ostracism or criticism; this may be conducted in front of one's fellow workers, for example, and leads to criticism by other members of the organization, and, eventually, to self-criticism and repentance. <sup>69</sup> In this manner, moral socialization--or at least compliance with expected behavior--is insured at the place of work, learning, social interaction.

Socialization through behavior is also performed by another, much more wide-spread mass organization, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution--which is the third important mobilization agent described by Fagen in his book. <sup>70</sup> While the CDR was formed in 1960 in response to counterrevolutionary activity, and as a purely vigilance-oriented body, Fagen reports that by 1968 it had acquired far broader scope. The organization was expected to "integrate, socialize, and mobilize the masses, to implement revolutionary policies

<sup>68</sup> This is especially true of the CDR; mention of the fact is scattered in Thomas, Sutherland, and Yglesias.

<sup>69</sup> Castro has been known to repeat such criticism-repentance sequences in his speeches. See also Barry Reckord, Does Fidel Eat More Than Your Father? (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), pp. 101-106.

<sup>70</sup> See also Nelson's brief discussion in Cuba, p. 179.



and programs, and to protect both the material and social resources of the revolution"; <sup>71</sup> and Fagen adds that a "sufficient" amount of this does go on <sup>72</sup> through such daily activities as: "coordination, organization, administration of finances, revolutionary instruction, vigilance, popular defense, education, public health administration, urban reform, provisioning (distribution of scarce goods), voluntary work, propaganda and cultural instruction, sports and recreation." <sup>73</sup>

The fact that the CDR is primarily a neighbourhood system which is concerned with local projects and local vigilance, its many varied areas of activity, and the recruitment drive for membership in the Committees, all combine to bring it into very intimate contact with almost, if not all, aspects of a Cuban's life--to the extent that some even compare it to a social and voluntary system of secret police. While participation-mobilization into various schemes might be regarded as a sort of citizenship training, the CDR also conducts a program of more formal study circles, through which Cuban ideology is taught; in the context of the latter, explanations about the course of the revolution are added to the daily political commentaries of the media.

Oddly enough, there has not been much mention in the literature on Cuba of a Party structure similar to that of most other socialist

<sup>71</sup> Fagen, The Transformation..., p. 80.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p. 80.



countries; <sup>74</sup> most writers seem to content themselves with writing of either Party influence or Party control over various areas of the system. <sup>75</sup> Fagen reports that in 1966 Cuba did not "yet have a fully functioning Marxist-Leninist party", <sup>76</sup> but that the basis for it had been laid; thus, he notes, in the future, when

recruitment is complete and the Party fully operative, it should give new unity and coherence to the other institutions of political education and mass mobilization. In addition to being the primary agency through which its own members become imbued with the revolutionary world view, the Party will also oversee the programs of political training carried on through the mass media, armed forces, mass organizations and schools. Organizationally, the Party represents the final (or at least the most recent) step in the drive for unanimity, control and the total utilization of human resources. <sup>77</sup>

Within the context of total, ideological socialization, no aspect of man's life is left outside the integrative socio-political process. Thus many other aspects of Cuban society would have to be included in a complete discussion of this type of "ideological socialization". A prime example that comes to mind is art--be it writing, painting, sculpture, or music--which, like the mass media, is used by the government to reinforce positive attitudes toward the system; stricter government control over art followed a Soviet-type

<sup>74</sup> See the brief discussion by Andrés Suárez, "Leadership, Ideology, and Political Party", in Revolutionary Change in Cuba, ed. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. 8-12.

<sup>75</sup> See Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy, Socialism in Cuba (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), pp. 219-220, Thomas, pp. 1456-1457, and Gil Green, Revolution Cuban Style (New York: International Publishers, 1970), pp. 76-80.

<sup>76</sup> Fagen, "Mass Mobilization in Cuba...", p. 211.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., p. 212.





debate on the contribution of art to the process of the Revolution, and the artist's duty in the revolutionary context.<sup>78</sup> Another dimension might be added by a discussion of Cuban economic theory and practice, especially in view of the total integration of ideology within every aspect of Cuban society; in this context, the moral versus material incentives debate,<sup>79</sup> or the effects of the granjas (collective farms) upon the peasants' perceptions of the system, might be examples of problems to be discussed. Generally, it must be remembered that economic, social, cultural and political aspects of change interplay and reinforce each other in a system of the Cuban type; thus culture change, as the leaders of the Revolution say, does not occur either through book-learning of new ideas, or through change in only one part of the system. It is a total process, and demands total change.

The Cuban system, like the Soviet system before it, has already experienced setbacks in its daring experiment. Some intellectuals, for instance, are either alienated, or in exile;<sup>80</sup> the huge

<sup>78</sup> Further discussion to be found in, among others, Lourdes Casal, "Literature and Society" in Mesa-Lago, Mario Benedetti, "Present Status of Cuban Culture" in Bonachea and Valdés, Cuba in Revolution, and Thomas, pp. 1463-1466; for an interesting comparison, see also Roque Dalton, "El Boom: la Ideología y la Poesía", El Caimán Barbudo, Epoca 11, No. 39 (June 1970), pp. 3-8.

<sup>79</sup> See Robert Bernardo, The Theory of Moral Incentives in Cuba (Alabama: The Univ. of Alabama Press, 1971), passim.

<sup>80</sup> See Maurice Halperin, The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro (Berkeley: The Univ. of California Press, 1972), pp. 348-361.



bureaucratic machine that was constructed to supervise the development process is increasingly difficult to control <sup>81</sup>--and, with the inertia that seems to characterize that type of body, it threatens to destroy "revolutionary fervor" and mobilization. In factories and in the fields, the rate of absenteeism is high <sup>82</sup>--and voluntary, inexperienced labor to which, more and more, people must be coerced, does not make up for it. Absenteeism is producing setbacks both in the hope for moral development and in the actual production quotas set for the particular institution, factory, ministry. The shortage of goods, the general tone of scarcity, over a long period of time, gives rise to public discontent--after all, shortages can be explained in terms of emergency situations only for so long, and the emotional type of mobilization is a temporary thing. <sup>83</sup> Signs of its wearing off show when people become disgruntled with voluntary labor that takes their spare time, with attending Marxist-Leninist classes or circles in the evenings, with listening to Fidel's six-hour long speeches, <sup>84</sup> with being "politically aware" and "developing their consciousness" at every moment of the day, with Cuban or Soviet documentaries on the

<sup>81</sup> See Renée Dumont, "The Militarization of Fidelismo," Dissent, 17 (Sept.-Oct. 1970), pp. 411-428; Suchlicki also touches on this, as well as the economic problem, in "An Assessment of Castroism".

<sup>82</sup> On absenteeism, loafing, lack of "consciousness", see Nelson, Cuba, pp. 115-126.

<sup>83</sup> Suchlicki in the article mentioned above, and Edward Gonzalez, "Castro: The Limits of Charisma", Problems of Communism, 19, No. 4 (July-Aug. 1970), 12-24, both mention the Cuban regime's increasing preoccupation with internal rather than external questions.

<sup>84</sup> On Castro's alleged failure to fulfill his promises, see Joseph Clark, "Thus Spake Fidel Castro", Dissent, 17 (Jan.-Feb. 1970), pp. 38-56.





newest type of bull developed, and so on. Reports coming from people who have visited Cuba recently are divided about equally into two camps: the "confidants" and the "pessimists"--and it is difficult to weigh which is right. Maurice Zeitlin, for instance, echoed the feeling of confidence that Lockwood received from the people:

The revolution has been a profoundly liberating experience for the Cuban people; they are conscious of themselves as historical actors, and have learned to believe in themselves, to take the implausible for granted and the unprecedented for certain--as "no one", they will tell you, "who has not lived within the revolutionary process can understand." "The most transcendental changes are within us", they say, "the ones that you cannot see, that are visible only to ourselves. No one who knows the Cuban past as only we can, of whoredom and corruption, of the infinite capacity to deceive oneself and others, to sell oneself to the highest bidder in all things, to lack faith in anything but the vulgar and to accept the obscene as natural--no one who lived this past as we did can doubt the great changes in our beings." <sup>85</sup>

Yet even if one takes the confident approach, there is still another problem--youth. In schools, the number of drop-outs is high, and the quality of teaching--because of a shortage of teachers and materials--poor; <sup>86</sup> and the greatest danger is that, as in the Soviet system, <sup>87</sup> the youth will come to take the revolution for granted, and will become dull, bored functionnaires in the system. William Daly notes that

to the degree that the movement's socialization of the younger generation is successful, it will weaken and eventually eliminate the hold of the old culture on

<sup>85</sup> Zeitlin, p. xlix.

<sup>86</sup> For a discussion on drop-outs, the quality of teaching, and hippie-type youth, see Nelson, Cuba, pp. 140-146.

<sup>87</sup> Jeremy Azrael, "Soviet Union", in Education and Political Development, ed. Lucian Pye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).



the inheritors themselves and on the society they confront, and with it, the militance which grows out of the struggle against that hold. When, at the end of this stage of declining militance, power passes to individuals born after the revolution and socialized since childhood in its ideology, militant behavior should therefore shade back into nonrevolutionary patterns of political behavior, albeit within the context of a reconstituted culture. The rise of these children of the revolution to leadership will therefore be both a triumph and a defeat for the fathers of the revolution. A triumph in the sense that this generation will have internalized most of the content of the revolutionary ideology and, in this sense, will represent the completion of the revolutionary task of remaking the man. A defeat, in the sense that the fiery revolutionaries, who struggled to mold the younger generation in their likeness, will bring forth a generation lacking in the central element of that likeness-fire. <sup>88</sup>

<sup>88</sup> William Daly, The Revolutionary: A Review and Synthesis (New York: Sage Publications, 1972), p. 34.



## CONCLUSION

Starting out with a dialectical--and quasi-deterministic--notion about the relationship between man and society, a hypothesis was postulated to the effect that a certain type of system would, theoretically, produce a certain type of man. More particularly, it was proposed that in the case of change-oriented mobilization systems, their characteristic "totalitarian" ideologies would a) direct the "changing-man" process and b) act directly in relation to traditional political cultures towards that end. The process that would link ideology and political culture in such a situation would be the (political) socialization process. Two consequent hypotheses were drawn from the above. One of these is the contention that an ideology which contains or uses some traditional culture strains will, on the positive scale, evoke a much more emotional--thus more powerfully committing--response than a culturally-alien body of ideas. The second hypothesis concerned the manner in which the interaction between ideology and political culture might be seen; in this case, a model of mutually reinforcing, progressive pattern of waves was proposed as more appropriate for the context of systemic change. This is particularly emphasized in the case of the new states, where the leaders' goal seems to be a Galatea-like transformation of man. The "model" is not original, insofar as most writers of socialization and political culture probably imply it to a great extent in their works. It does, however, emphasize a differentiation between processes that take place in the context of





willful rapid change, as opposed to the situation that occurs in so-called stable and developed societies.

To these ends, it was necessary to select a definition of "ideology" that would be congruent with the context of change; historically, a functional, action-lever image seemed to fit best in this case. The next step was to attempt an elucidation of the other two terms involved in the discussion, political culture and political socialization. Their respective definitions were purposefully vague for two reasons: a) the terms themselves are vague and, b) conceptually, they are shadowy areas because of their very close interrelationship. The same chapter attempted to give a general impression of the manner in which, symbolically as well as institutionally, ideology, socialization and culture may be seen to interact, particularly in mobilization systems. In this context, emphasis was placed on the processes of socialization through appropriate behavior and affective symbols.

Along more practical lines, while most developing states' (as well as Communist systems') ideologies proclaimed the need to build the new man who in turn might build a particular utopia, each one of them had various other goals, which were possibly more pressing. Moreover, each operated in different settings which, in most cases, influenced both their directional content and their functions. In order to illustrate these types of differentiations in ideologies that, theoretically, operated in similar types of systems, brief overviews of three rather special cases were sketched. Négritude was chosen because of both its uncommon origin and the idealistic level at which it operates; Ujamaa was pertinent because of the clever use of



tradition it makes; finally, Castroism was a natural choice because of its flexibility and action-orientation, which fitted the "theoretical" definition of ideology.

Lastly, in chapter four, an attempt was made to illustrate the ideology-socialization-culture intermeshing, through an overview of the Cuban experiment with the "making of the new man". The "case" has tended to congrue with the expectations implicit in the hypothesis proposed with respect to ideologies and traditions. For instance, in terms of the traditional political culture that has bred the Cuban revolution, the act of rebellion itself, is totally comprehensible; in a similar manner, the features of the Cuban regime that are most observable--charismatic rule, personal dictatorship, unity against the foreign enemy--fit the historical-political tradition that existed in Cuba.

Whether ideologies make conscious or unconscious use of particularly suited and easily-responded-to patterns within their traditional cultures is difficult to ascertain. A first assumption would have to be that the elite knows what traditional culture is, that it has studied it, and that it has, rationally, decided to use it. Yet another assumption would be that elite perception of the situation would yield positive indicators of the theoretical assumptions. Until research uncovers positive support for the contention that the leaders act consciously in this respect, the question remains open.

Ideologies such as Castroism, as tools of change, attempt to build new political cultures that will change man, awaken a new consciousness and new patterns of orientations in society, in order





to prepare him for the new, egalitarian, morally-rewarding society; the new political culture will also gain legitimacy and support for both present and future societies. Yet, predictably enough, the new man may find the system that has created him restraining and conservative. The developed consciousness of an ideal society, combined with an increasing awareness of more materialistic cultures, may make him less willing to build that society in the distant future, and more desirous of having at least some of the material advantages now.

One role of political cultures, as defined above, was to limit the numbers and kinds of wants seeking entry as demands into the system. If the ideology's role is to rationalize and legitimate a particular political state of affairs as well as to hasten modernization and give priorities and directives to the processes of change, and if it is conceded that ideologies, with all their institutions, myths, etc. are the tools of change for political cultures, then it follows that once the political culture has been put on the path of change, there will be different kinds of wants seeking entry as demands. That is, once the change has been made in the input-output process, the output which is to become input again will be different. For instance, the literacy campaign in Cuba, which opened up new horizons for many people, has also created an awareness which, unchannelled, may become a threat for the regime.<sup>1</sup> The inference made here is

<sup>1</sup> On the question of creating wider awareness and deepening intellectual horizons, Paulo Freire is probably the leading writer today; since his analysis is political as much as educational, it cannot but have systemic (political) implications; Pedagogy of the Oppressed, tr. M. B. Ramos (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970).



that ideologies, as tools of change, must be manipulated carefully and watched constantly; for the political culture may progress into the projected future society, and challenge the legitimacy of the present system.

The discussion has come back full circle to the proposed model of ideology and political culture as a pattern of perpetually propagating waves, in which the dynamic force is supplied by political socialization. Thus a situation where the new, changed political culture would legitimate and support a political system completely and without reserve for a long period of time, is an impossibility, made so by its very static nature. Political culture will always be either one step behind or one step ahead of the ideology; its basic unit is man, an ever-changing, curious animal, seeking to improve--or at least change--his environment. Yet, this dynamic phenomenon that is man, also bears the scars of living in an extremely insecure world; and his underdeveloped consciousness of his own "place under the sun" makes him seek security and comfort in what is traditional and, more or less, anchored in time.



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